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ABSTRACT
DOGMATISM, COPING, AND SPIRITUALITY:
PREDICTING MENTAL HEALTH AMONG THE RELIGIOUS AND THE SECULAR
Jonathan T. Moore
October 28, 2013
Religiousness has frequently been found to positively predict numerous types of
beneficial mental health variables in previous literature. These results have often been
inferred by scholars to mean that secular groups have poorer levels of mental health
despite rarely including secular populations in studies. An ideological diverse sample of
4,667 respondents provided usable data in the current correlational study that measured
the relationships between general dogmatism levels, existential belief strength, spiritual
coping, spiritual harmony (i.e., the degree to which one lives in accordance with their
self-defined values) and six indicators of mental health. The sample was comprised
mainly of agnostic, atheist, Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, and spiritual nonreligious
participants. Multi-group analyses within structural equation models and multivariate
analysis of covariance procedures were used to investigate hypotheses. The data showed
that religious and secular adherents had null differences on five of the six mental health
indicators. Further, dogmatism, existential belief strength, and spiritual coping levels all
had small-sized standardized regression weights that were statistically significant but
weakly predictive of mental health levels even when measured at the ideological group
level. Spiritual harmony levels were the only statistically significant standardized
v

regression weight across all groups that was large in magnitude. The implications of the
current study suggest that living in accordance with one’s spiritual values, regardless of
how those values are defined, is strongly characteristic of better mental health.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Debate regarding the relationship between religion and mental health has endured
for decades. Prominent figures of the field of psychology have often weighed in on
opposing sides on whether there is a positive association between religious aspects and
mental health or a negative relationship between the two. Both Sigmund Freud
(1927/1964) and Albert Ellis (1971) articulated that psychopathology co-occurs with
religiousness while other pioneers in the field, such as Carl Jung (1933/1947) and Gordon
Allport (1950), argued that religion contributed beneficially to one’s psychological wellbeing.
Definitions
Before proceeding, a clarification of terms will be provided. These definitions are
in no way final, and instead are reflective of their consistent usage in psychological
research while achieving a respectable, albeit limited, degree of comprehensiveness.
Religion is “a system of beliefs in a divine or superhuman power, and practices of
worship or other rituals directed towards such a power” (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975,
p. 1). This definition is used because by regarding religion as a system it implies that
religion is a social institution that one can be affiliated with which separates religion
somewhat from other terms (e.g., spirituality). Likewise, the term religiousness will be
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used to describe one’s level of commitment to their religion. Religiousness (i.e.,
religiosity) is operationalized in the literature a number of ways: attendance of religious
services, agreement with religious doctrines, or the frequency that one prays or meditates,
among many others.
Secular is an adjective that denotes something as having no religious affiliation.
As follows, a secular person refers to one who is nonreligious or one who is indifferent or
oblivious to religion (Zuckerman, 2009). Often included in this secular category are
those who consider themselves atheists, agnostics, and those who consider themselves
spiritual but not religious. Zuckerman defines an atheist as someone who does not
believe that God exists or finds the concept of God meaningless or incoherent. While
agnostics, according to Zuckerman, commonly take two distinct forms. Agnostics are
either unsure/undecided about the existence of God, or they believe that the existence of
God is beyond the scope of human comprehension and is a concept that is unknowable.
Health is a value laden term that is understood differently depending on the
cultural perspective and the context. In deference to this diversity, the term mental health
will be used in a broad sense that includes any psychological characteristic that indicates
the degree to which one is experiencing better functioning (e.g., high quality of life),
adaptive traits (e.g., resiliency), attributes that would commonly be regarded as
advantageous (e.g., positive affect), or the extent that one is not experiencing attributes
that impair normal functioning (e.g., depressive symptoms), are maladaptive (e.g.,
aggressiveness), or would commonly be regarded as unfavorable (e.g., suicidality).
Other pertinent terms will be defined as they are introduced.
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Where the Debate Stands Now
The scholarly discourse and associated research regarding the religion and mental
health connection has continued in more recent times. Koenig and Larson (2001)
supplied a narrative review of the research in the past century and found that
religiousness frequently showed a favorable relationship with indicators of mental health,
such as lower rates of depression and substance abuse and higher rates of psychological
well-being and life satisfaction. Schumaker’s (1992) review summarized several studies
indicating that higher levels of religiousness are associated with lower levels of
pathological symptomology. Schumaker posited that “irreligion” leads to mental health
consequences by inhibiting social and cognitive pathways to psychological health.
Koenig, McCullough, and Larson (2001), the most comprehensive review of its kind,
examined several hundred articles and frequently came across findings that greater
religiousness was positively associated with numerous mental health variables: life
satisfaction, happiness, positive affect, and/or morale (in 79 out of 100 studies); greater
purpose and meaning and life (in 15 out of 16 studies); greater self-esteem (in 16 out of
28 studies); healthier adaptation to bereavement (in 8 out of 17 studies); less loneliness
(in 4 out of 10 studies); less depression (in 60 out of 93 studies); less suicidality (in 57
out of 68 studies); less anxiety (in 35 out of 69 studies); less psychosis (in 4 out of 10
studies); and less substance abuse (in 124 out of 136 studies). Bergin (1983)
demonstrated via meta-analytic methods that there was a small, positive relationship
between religiousness and favorable indicators of mental health. The acceptance of the
connection between religion and mental health is becoming so widespread and supported
that Sloan and Bagiella (2002) noted that many training programs now include

3

preparation for integrating spiritual components into clinical work and that insurance
companies, notorious for typically reimbursing only beneficial and empirically supported
treatments (Ambrose, 1997), are compensating their consumers for spiritual counseling.
Given the preponderance of these scholarly positions and empirical evidence, perhaps
social scientists have settled the debate that mental health and religion co-occur
harmoniously.
However, to accept such a conclusion would be disregarding a noticeably
substantial portion of studies, numbering more than a hundred (about 25%) of the
aforementioned works reviewed in Koenig et al. (2001), that have found either an
absence of a relation or an inverse relation between religion and mental health. While
conceivable, it is unlikely that such a large number of studies could find an inverse or
absent relationship purely due to methodological or statistical issues such as insufficient
statistical power. Resultantly, other explanations exploring the relationships should be
investigated. Beit-Hallahmi (2007) supplied a narrative review of the psychological
profiles of atheists and concluded that atheists are not necessarily anymore neurotic than
religious individuals. Other exceptions to the momentous tide of positive associative
findings between religion and mental health have manifested across multiple definitions
of mental health. For example, neuroticism and other negativistic traits were indicated in
similar magnitudes between differing levels of religiousness (Francis, Pearson, Carter, &
Kay, 1981; Sharkey & Malony, 1986). King and Schafer (1992) did not find a
relationship between religious experience and perceived stress but found a positive
relationship between perceived stress and church attendance. According to Sorenson,
Grindstaff, and Turner (1995), depressive symptoms were the least numerous in those
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who identified as not at all religious. Maslow (1970) found that those who were
classified as self-actualized (i.e., living to their potential) were more likely to be atheists.
Hunsberger, Pratt, and Pancer (2001a) found that psychological adjustment (e.g., selfesteem, optimism) was essentially no different between those socialized as nonreligious
to those with religious upbringings among adolescents. Breaking from the single time
point data collection models, Atchley’s (1997) 14 year longitudinal study demonstrated
that participants who maintained their religiousness or nonreligiousness across the study
shared insignificant differences between each other in regards to their self-rated health,
functional health, and morale levels at the conclusion of the study. Overall, a noticeable
host of studies have found inverse or absent relations between religiousness among a
variety of different mental health variables.
Notable Analyses Exploring the Relationship
The relationship between religion and mental health has revealed complex
interrelations with each other when analyzed and defined carefully. Ventis (1995)
astutely demonstrated that the way one defines both religious orientation and mental
health has important implications for revealing potential associations. Ventis noted that
the directionality and strength of the relationship between religious and mental health
variables will vary depending on the definitions of the constructs used. Using Allport
and Ross’s (1967) intrinsic and extrinsic type religious orientations, as well as Batson,
Schoenrade and Ventis’ (1993) religion-as-quest- orientation, Ventis noted that intrinsic
orientations were associated with positive indicators of mental health, such as a selfactualization, appropriate social behavior, and lower rates of worry and guilt, to name a
few. Additionally, Ventis’ review of the literature found that extrinsic orientations often
5

had negative relationships with several of these definitions of mental health while
religion-as-quest possessed mixed relationships.
Hackney and Sanders (2003) further confirmed the nuanced relationship between
religion and mental health as previously detailed by Ventis (1995). Hackney and
Sanders’ meta analysis indicated that generally the relationship between religious and
mental health constructs produced an overall effect size of r =.10 that was resultant from
a heterogenous pool of effect sizes. In other words, the general relationship between
religiousness and mental health appeared to be strongly affected by unmeasured
influences. In contrast, when the authors used more specific definitions of mental health,
namely psychological distress, life satisfaction, and self-actualization, it was found that
those who exhibited a religious style of personal devotedness (e.g., strong attachment to
God) possessed effect sizes of .11, .14, and .32, respectively. When religious style was
defined as an institutional type of religiousness (e.g., attended church), the effects were
weaker and sometimes negative in relation to the various constructs of mental health just
noted. Specifically, institutional type effect sizes for psychological distress, life
satisfaction, and self-actualization were -.03, .10 and .07, respectively. Hackney and
Sanders’ study noted evidence of heterogeneity of the localized effect sizes for both of
the religiousness constructs. This suggested that other moderating influences are involved
that may dictate the nature of the relationship between various conceptualizations and
definitions of both religiousness and mental health.
The Overlooked Curvilinear Relationship and Dogmatism
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In addition to the studies that found statistically nonsignificant differences in
mental health between religious and secular participants, other empirical evidence
supports a compelling claim that the oft declared “linear” relationship (i.e., as
religiousness increases so do mental health levels), as it is sometimes called (e.g., Galen
& Kloet, 2010), does not fully capture the complexity of the association between these
two variables.
Curvilinear relationship. Among studies that have tested for curvilinear effects,
evidence for a curvilinear relationship between mental health variables and
religiousness/secularity levels have been demonstrated (Buggle, Bister, Nohe, Scheider,
& Uhmann, 2000; Diener & Clifton, 2002; Galen & Kloet, 2010; Maselko & Buka, 2008;
Riley, 2005; Ross, 1990; Schnittker, 2001; Shaver, Lenauer & Sadd, 1980; Wilkinson &
Coleman, 2010). The curvilinear effect suggests that those who are strongly religious or
strongly secular (e.g., highly atheistic) are more likely to experience better mental health
than agnostics, religious “nones” (i.e., those who identify as having no religious
affiliation), skeptics and doubters, and the less religious. Figure 1 provides an example.
Studies that have found support for a linear effect have often considered that secular
persons can be combined with the less religious (e.g., Pollner, 1989). Thus, the linear
model has erroneously implied that secular groups, such as atheists, would experience
poorer mental health because they are essentially no different from groups who are not
highly religious. This methodological issue will be elaborated on in the appropriate
section.
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Figure 1. An example supporting a curvilinear relationship between theistic/atheistic
certainty and indicators of mental health. From “Mental well-being in the religious and
non-religious: Evidence for a curvilinear relationship,” by L.W. Galen & J.D. Kloet,
2010, Mental Health, Religion, & Culture, p.11. Advance online publication. Copyright
2011, by Taylor & Francis Online. Reprinted with permission.
Dogmatism. A commonly used method of quantifying one’s religiousness or
secularity is to gauge how strongly one believes in their ideology, or in other words,
one’s level of dogmatism. Altemeyer’s (1996) definition of dogmatism referred to it as
an unjustified certainty and conviction that is resilient against opposing beliefs.
Dogmatism, in this context, differs from constructs like cognitive rigidity in that
dogmatism focuses on one’s beliefs about important life issues, while cognitive rigidity is
often operationalized as lacking critical thinking or limited creativity in one’s responses
in everyday tasks (e.g., Schotte & Clum, 1982). As Ross (1990) demonstrated,
8

measuring one’s strength of beliefs is a key variable to consider, which contradicts the
typical scholarly procedure of simply measuring whether those beliefs are religious or
not. Ross’ study is also notable in that it found the curvilinear effect (i.e., higher levels of
belief strength, either religious or secular, both related to greater mental health) across
multiple groups, including Protestants, Catholics, Jews, as well as those who identified as
having no religion. Similarly, Galen and Kloet (2010) found the same type of curvilinear
relationship with mental health when asking participants to clarify their level of certainty
that God exists/does not exist (as was illustrated for Figure 1). Buggle et al.’s (2000)
methodology was similar in that they also gauged for degrees of religious belief but their
methodology slightly differed in that their secular comparison group was made up of
highly dogmatic participants who considered themselves “militant” or “determined”
atheists. Nonetheless, the same curvilinear relationship was found.
It is important to note that similar to religiousness, there are various degrees of
nonreligion or secularity. For example, Whitley (2010) described atheists who simply
lack a belief in God as compared to atheists who assertively commit themselves to a
disbelief in God. The latter group would qualify as the more dogmatic with their secular
worldview.
Not only is the curvilinear relationship being evidenced across multiple
conceptualizations of ideological strength or dogmatism, but it is also being corroborated
across several different indicators of mental health. The curvilinear effect was seen in
general measures of psychological distress or psychiatric symptomology (Ross, 1990;
Shaver et al., 1980), emotional stability and life satisfaction (Galen & Kloet, 2010),
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lifetime prevalence of a psychiatric disorder (Maselko & Buka, 2008), and depressive
symptomology (Buggle et al., 2000, Schnittker, 2001; Wilkinson & Coleman, 2010).
By considering belief strength or higher levels of certainty, regardless of their
ideological underpinnings, are arguably the salient factor that accompanies better mental
health, studying weaker allegiances and more skeptical belief systems may help increase
scholarly understanding of the relationship with mental health effects. Previous research
is consistent with weaker allegiance and skeptical belief systems relating to poorer mental
health. Lower levels of dogmatism have been predictive of higher anxiety levels
(Rokeach, 1960) and more pathological psychological profiles (Richek, Mayo, &
Puryear, 1970). Religious doubt has been related to higher levels of depression (Krause
& Wulff, 2004), psychological distress (Krause, Ingersoll-Dayton, Ellison, & Wulff,
1999), and lower levels of life satisfaction, self-esteem, and optimism (Krause, 2006).
According to Hunsberger, Pratt, and Pancer (2001b) and Puffer et al. (2008), religious
doubt may be an indicator that one is experiencing identity moratorium (i.e., seeking an
identity but not having strongly committed to any identity status or label). Perhaps the
people who are located at the reduced mental health levels portion of the curvilinear
relationship are experiencing identity moratorium. In consideration that, in general,
experiencing identity moratorium is associated with higher anxiety levels (Broderick &
Blewitt, 2010), one would also expect to find lower levels of mental health. There is also
initial evidence that fluctuating religiousness levels are associated with having had been
diagnosed with Generalized Anxiety Disorder and alcohol abuse/dependence (Maselko &
Buka, 2008).
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Other research has found that when one’s beliefs are successfully challenged and
cognitive dissonance is experienced higher levels of negative affect are frequently
observed (Burris, Harmon-Jones, & Tarpley, 1997). This finding by Burris et al. (1997)
is relevant in that it is conceptually similar to the aforementioned studies that found lower
strengths of beliefs predicting negative mental health consequences. It is also relevant for
the purpose of the current paper to note that cognitive styles have evidenced a
relationship to whether one believes in God both correlationally and experimentally
(Shenhav, Rand, & Green, 2011). In light of these findings and the information described
by previous theorists (e.g., Beck, 1976), there is evidence for an interrelationship between
thinking styles and emotions, which in turn suggests that mental health has an
interrelationship with one’s cognitions. Thus, investigating the specific relationship
between indicators of dogmatism, a cognitive style of its own, and mental health may
further scientific understanding of protective factors or buffers against stress.
Unfortunately, when one looks beyond the previously mentioned studies that
found a curvilinear effect there is little research on these in-between groups, such as
agnostics or religious “nones,” because they are often combined with a nonreligious or
atheist group within research samples. Agnostics in particular may be undergoing doubt
or moratorium experiences, which may partly explain lower levels of mental health
because they lack the protective factor that is a dogmatic certainty or an orienting
worldview that can buffer forms of stress. This hypothesis is warranted, especially when
one considers that one common definition of agnosticism (of several possible definitions)
is being unsure or undecided about God’s existence (Zuckerman, 2009). Zuckerman’s
other definition of agnosticism, believing that the existence of God is one matter that is
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beyond the scope of human comprehension, suggests that tolerating ambiguity about
existential matters may result in negative mental health consequences, if one considers
the research demonstrating the curvilinear effect. Altogether, the evidence found thus far
suggests that when one’s cognitive framework or belief systems are not well solidified
that poorer mental health tends to co-occur among populations that are only slightly
religious, fluctuating, or unsure.
Several attributes may potentially covary with dogmatism. Richek et al. (1970)
found that dogmatism’s relationship with mental health varied between genders with
health benefits being evidenced in males only. Right wing authoritarianism (RWA), a
construct that is convergent with dogmatism and refers to a high degree of
submissiveness to leaders and social norms as well as distaste for outsiders, was found to
be more pronounced in older adults (Altemeyer, 1996). Altemeyer also reported that
RWA is inversely related to education level, but this effect is small. These findings
suggest that similar relationship directionalities may hold up when measuring dogmatism
specifically.
Other Explanations of Mental Health for the Religious and the Secular
Spirituality. Scholars have struggled to define spirituality and resultantly there
has been some difficulty identifying what these necessary ingredients of spirituality
might be. Gorusch (2002) defined spirituality as “the quest for understanding ourselves
in relationship to our view of ultimate reality, and to live in accordance with that
understanding” (p.8). Hood, Hill, and Spilka (2009) noted the complexity and confusion
of the term spirituality and then vaguely defined it by mentioning several of its features
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that distinguish it from religion: spirituality is both personal and subjective, does not
require an institutional framework or a deity, and is strongly informed by one’s
commitment to values. Spirituality is also more psychological while religion is more
sociological.
Most of the information presented thus far has conceptualized results in terms of
religiousness and nonreligiousness or religious and secular identities (e.g., atheists and
agnostics), as the bulk of previous literature has tended to do. Such terminology is
confining and it is important to consider conceptual models that can inform future
research and further theoretical advances. One such work, Koenig (2008), summarized
that historically in the psychology of religion and spirituality literature, religion was
considered the supraordinate category while spirituality was considered the subordinate
characteristic that was not necessarily shared by all who were religious. The model
entailed that religious and/or spiritual traits contribute to mental health. Scholars often
made conclusions regarding secularity and mental health’s relationship despite rarely
including secular samples.
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Figure 2. Previous scholarly understanding of the relationship between religion,
spirituality, and secularity with mental health. From “Concerns about measuring
“spirituality” in research,” by H.G. Koenig, 2008, Journal of Nervous and Mental
Disease, 196, p. 350. Copyright 2008 by Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. Reprinted with
permission.
Koenig (2008) proceeded to discuss that more modern research reflects a different
understanding in the way that spirituality and religion are described, as presented in
Figure 3. This modernized conceptual model reflects that the literature is now
conceptualizing religion as a nonessential subcategory to one’s spirituality, and that
secular groups may also be spiritual. The noteworthy element of this conceptualization is
that the religion and mental health connection has been found in previous literature not
because religion is the essential and active mechanism that is associated with health, but
that spirituality possesses the active ingredients that co-occur, even among those who
possess secular identities. Hood et al.’s (2009) descriptive features are congruent with
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Koenig’s conceptualization that religion is a nonessential, but sometimes co-occurring
element of spirituality.

Figure 3. Current scholarly depiction of the relationship between religion, spirituality,
and secularity with mental health. Note the overlapping conceptualization of spirituality
with measures of mental health in the figure. This reflects a methodological shortcoming
in the scholarly literature that will be elaborated in a later section of the current paper.
From “Concerns about measuring “spirituality” in research,” by H.G. Koenig, 2008,
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 196, p. 351. Copyright 2008 by Lippincott
Williams & Wilkins. Reprinted with permission.
Components of spirituality. There are several thematic elements in the complex
construct of spirituality that have frequently appeared in various conceptual models of
spirituality and in the creation of scales measuring spirituality. Chiu, Emblen, Van
Hofwegen, Sawatzky, and Meyerhoff’s (2004) literature search of over 70 qualifying
articles found four major themes recurring frequently in the differing conceptualizations
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of spirituality espoused by scholars: existential reality; connectedness; transcendence;
and power/force/energy. Existential reality refers to a personal journey to discover
meaning and purpose in one’s life. The connectedness theme reflected relationships with
other people communally, the environment, and a higher power. Themes of
transcendence typically denoted a capacity to attain new perspectives and experiences
that were beyond physical reality. The final theme found by Chiu et al. used terms such
as power, force, or energy that represented a fueling motivation or compeller within an
individual that was used to make significant life choices and engage in self-discovery.
Fisher’s (1998) own review of the spirituality literature not only led to similar
thematic elements that reflect the spirituality literature and help define spirituality as a
construct, but he also went a step further by creating a theoretical model that addressed
how spirituality contributes to one’s overall health. His description of spirituality is
similar in scope to Chiu et al.’s (2004) findings, with only slight differences that allowed
for describing the nature of the spirituality and health connection. Most notably of these,
Fisher (1998) argued that his four domains respective to his conceptual model build upon
each other in order to instill a holistic level of health, a notion he referred to as
“progressive synergism” (p. 28). The initial domain, the personal domain, is a precursor
for later spiritual experiences, and it includes aspects such as one’s sense of identity,
meaningfulness, and purpose in life. Being in this personal state of spiritual fulfillment
allows one to beneficially experience deep interpersonal relationships with others and the
community, referred to as the communal domain. The environmental domain follows
and the individual’s constitution incorporates a sense of respect for nature and being a
steward for the environment at large. Finally, the transcendental spiritual domain that
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follows and is important in achieving a sense of wellness and health is the experiencing
of a relationship with a force beyond humanity, which may include a healthy relationship
to God, some ultimate concern that one values, or a cosmic power. Fisher stated that the
beneficial quality that one experiences in each of these four domains will vary throughout
life due to the positive and negative circumstances that humans endure, but one’s health
is enhanced by the synergism between each of these domains when each are experienced
with greater quality. As follows, one will undergo greater health, including mental
health, if they value and are able to experience the tenets associated across the four
domains of personal, communal, environmental, and transcendental. Spiritual harmony is
another facet of Fisher’s spiritual health model (Fisher & Brumley, 2006) that has
implications for one’s well-being. Spiritual harmony is the congruence between one’s
personal definition of spiritual health and whether they are living up to that standard or
not. A person who has spiritual ideals and beliefs but does not live in accordance with
those ideals would be in a state of lower spiritual harmony (i.e., spiritual dissonance), and
it theoretically follows that the person would experience mental health consequences.
Evidence for spirituality and mental health connection. Not only does the
spirituality and mental health connection have a theoretical foundation, numerous studies
have established empirical support that multiple facets and conceptualizations of the
spirituality construct contribute favorably to one’s mental health (Barcus, 1999;
Comptom, 2000; Coward, 1991; Fabricatore, Handal, & Fenzel, 2000; Fry, 2000; Genia,
1996; Mofidi et al., 2007; Saxena, 2006; Tsuang et al., 2002; Veach & Chappel, 1992).
The theoretical and empirical support coalesce to strongly suggest a positive and perhaps
linear association between spirituality and mental health.
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When one also considers Koenig’s (2008) interpretation of the modern research
literature that stated that spirituality is associated with mental health, a compelling
argument is born that perhaps the spirituality and mental health relationship is what
scholars have been describing all along even when they were using religious identity or
religiousness as a variable in previous studies throughout the years. Religiousness may
have been acting as a proxy variable. Restated, the last century of research demonstrating
that religiousness contributes to one’s mental health may have actually been tapping into
the spirituality and mental health connection instead which may explain previous findings
and the linear nature of those findings. Further, given the preponderance of null findings
that evidenced non-statistically significant relationships between religiousness and mental
health, such as the ones reviewed by Koenig et al. (2001), it becomes possible the
methodologies employed by those studies were more situated to tap into religious
elements that excluded components of spirituality, with the spiritual components being
the actual essential ingredients responsible in the relationship with mental health. This
hypothesis is supported by the fact that, as discussed earlier, intrinsic religiousness
(Ventis, 1995) and personal devotion in religiousness (Hackney & Sanders, 2003) show
more consistently positive and larger effect sizes with mental health variables than other
variables, such as extrinsic religiousness. Of further note, both of these constructs,
personal devotion and intrinsic religiousness, are conceptually overlapping with
spirituality constructs if one consults the definitions presented by Hood et al. (2009)
previously discussed. As stated earlier, constructs such as extrinsic religiousness show
weaker effects or more often indicate inverse relationships in regards to their association
with mental health (Hackney & Sanders, 2003; Ventis, 1995). Moreover, the extrinsic
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religiousness construct is not overlapping and is conceptually different from spirituality
constructs. With these implications considered, the more capable a research study can
incorporate spirituality constructs the more likely a positive and perhaps even linear
association between spirituality and mental health will be evidenced.
Secular spirituality. Other research has supported the proposed facets of
spirituality in secular populations, such as atheists (Burkhardt, 1994; Stanard, Sandhu, &
Painter, 2000), who presumably may derive psychological benefits often found associated
with spirituality. Burnard (1988) noted that atheists and agnostics actively searched for
meaning in life and Hungelmann, Kenkel-Rossi, Klassen, and Stollenwork (1985) found
that atheists and agnostics value interpersonal connectedness with others. Both of those
constructs are reflected in the spirituality themes and models of Fisher (1998) and Chiu et
al. (2004), but these were indirect findings only suggesting at a secular spirituality.
In contrast to the indirect indication of spirituality described in Burnard’s (1988)
and Hungelmann et al.’s (1985) questioning of secular populations, Chappel’s (1990)
more explicit questioning of atheists and agnostics found that many members of these
groups consider spirituality to be relevant in their lives. Similarly, O’Connell and
Skevington’s (2005) study found that Buddhists, Quakers, and Christians, as well as
atheists and agnostics, all valued concepts of spiritual strength, meaning in life, and inner
peace in similar magnitudes and regarded each facet as important for one’s quality of life.
As a whole, these studies illustrated that spirituality can operate outside of religion and
mirror Koenig’s interpretation of the research literature regarding the relationship of
spirituality to mental health. Chiu (2000) suggested that cross-cultural examinations
could play a role in determining common elements of spirituality. Perhaps examining the
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spiritual elements considered by secular cultural groups can help expand on what
spirituality means for diverse groups and alleviate some of the scholarly confusion
surrounding the construct.
Coping strategies. The relation between coping strategies and mental health has
received substantial focus in the psychological literature. One consensus that scholars
currently accept is that there is no “magic bullet” coping strategy that attenuates stress
uniformly in all situations across all types of people (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).
Different coping strategies may be effective or maladaptive for mental health outcomes
depending on the context and person. Nonetheless, Aldwin and Revenson (1987) noted
that contextually less adaptive coping strategies tend to co-occur with poorer mental
health and that coping strategies are sometimes causal explanations for such outcomes.
Two main categorizations of coping strategies are emotion focused and problem/action
focused coping. Emotion focused coping refers to efforts aimed at modifying one’s
reaction to a stressor, whereas problem/action focused coping reflects strategies aimed at
modifying the actual cause of one’s stress. One specific type of coping that does not
cleanly fit into either of these categories are religious or spiritual coping strategies
(Tamres, Janicki, & Hegelson, 2002). Religious and spiritual coping strategies deserve
sufficient attention as they are sometimes seen to be the most frequent style of coping
used (e.g., Conway, 1985-86) and used by large percentages of samples, sometimes
between 80-90% (Ayele, Mulligan, Gheorigu, & Reyes-Ortiz; Koenig & Larson, 2001).
With stressful circumstances affecting mental health, and with coping strategies at least
partially moderating this relationship, it becomes relevant to investigate the roles of both
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secular coping and religious/spiritual coping styles to better understand the overall
relationship with mental health.
Religious and spiritual coping. Religious and spiritual coping research has
evolved throughout the years. It typically focused on religious aspects in the primary and
more spiritual aspects secondarily, if at all. Early literature was limited in that it
indirectly argued for religious coping’s positive effects by using indicators such as prayer
frequency or church attendance to delineate contributions to mental health (e.g., Sherkat
& Reed, 1992). Later works discussed religious coping from a somewhat limited
problem-solving coping style perspective (e.g., Pargament et al., 1988). Pargament,
Koenig, and Perez’s (2000) more recent and comprehensive description of religious
coping discuss it as having five functions, including some distinctly spiritual aspects, that
are derivations from religion’s functions and go beyond just problem-solving
implications of previous conceptualizations. 1) Religious coping can manifest as a
cognitive framework that helps one find meaning, interpret, and understand baffling or
stress inducing circumstances (e.g., believing that suffering a catastrophe was not a
random act, but done with the purpose so that one would seek a stronger relationship with
God in response). 2) Religious coping may include connecting spiritually with other
people as well as a divine entity or cosmic force (e.g., praying to God to help others that
are in need). 3) Religious coping can include acts or beliefs that provide spiritual comfort
by reducing one’s apprehension to thrive in a mortal world and also encourage one to
connect with a force that is beyond the physical world (e.g., seeking strength or support
from God to help get through a difficult task). 4) Religious coping can provide a sense of
control over stressful situations (e.g., a victim of theft who finds comfort in the belief
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that karma will punish an escaped thief). 5) Religious coping can guide one from living
an unfulfilling lifestyle to one that has new spiritual values (e.g., dissatisfaction within a
Christian’s life that encourages the Christian to live a more Biblically congruent
lifestyle). Despite the important contributions to the field, as a whole, the religious
coping literature is limited in scope because it emphasizes the more confined notion of
religion rather than the more comprehensive aspects that are spirituality. Also, like the
coping literature in general, religious coping literature is inherently limited to discussing
reactions to stress. To better understand mental health outcomes, emphasizing the roles
of protectiveness and resiliency to stress are also important (Benard, 1991).
Religious and spiritual coping strategy research has evidenced favorable
outcomes with many mental health variables, such as confidence, self-esteem, tension,
and mood, (Pargament et al. 1990); personal growth (Lucero, 2010); boredom, social
withdrawal, hopelessness, sadness, and restlessness (Koenig et al., 1995); psychological
distress (Pargament et al., 1994); and adjustment to bereavement (McIntosh, Cohen
Silver, & Wortman, 1993). The results of Krägeloh, Pei Minn Chai, Shepherd, and
Billington (2010) suggested that individuals with lower levels of spirituality and
religiousness are more likely to use avoidant and escapist coping strategies that are
typically maladaptive for one’s mental health while higher levels of spirituality and
religiousness were associated with positive indications of health. In this regard,
accounting for levels of religiousness and spirituality may be important contextual
determinants for dictating the relationship between religious and spiritual coping
strategies and mental health. With respect to the general strength of the effect of positive
religious coping, Ano and Vasconcelles’ (2005) meta-analysis of 49 studies found that it
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covaried with healthy psychological adjustment with a medium-strength effect size of Zr
= .33.
Although religious and spiritual coping may be associated with better mental
health outcomes, one might question whether the effect of these coping styles are
redundant when other beneficial but purely secular coping mechanisms are in the picture.
Numerous studies have shown that even though secular coping and religious coping often
co-occur, they are not entirely redundant in regards to their relationship with mental
health outcomes. When the beneficial effects of secular coping are statistically controlled
for, the advantageous effects of religious coping still remain with statistically significant
strength for general psychological distress (Pargament et al., 1990), positive affect (Brant
& Pargament, 1995, as cited in Pargament, 1997; Pargament et al., 1994), negative affect
(Pargament, Smith, & Brant, 1995, as cited in Pargament, 1997) depression (VandeCreek
et al., 2004), and anxiety (Vandecreek et al., 1995, as cited in Pargament, 1997).
Religious and spiritual coping may be additively effective beyond secular coping
because it gives a sense of control in uncontrollable stressful situations (Siegel,
Anderman, & Schrimshaw, 2001). For example, invoking the support of or pleading with
a higher power such as God may help alleviate personal distress because it creates the
sense that the individual has countered and remedied the previously unalterable stressful
problem to some degree by adding a level of control to the situation. This phenomenon is
reminiscent of the old adage “there are no atheists in foxholes.” While secular coping
mechanisms may be slightly more limited in usefulness in certain situations, religious and
spiritual coping mechanisms may be perceived as unlimited in power by their users who
believe in omnipotent sacred entities (Lucero, 2010). Perhaps religious and spiritual
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coping have an attractive benefit that purely secular coping cannot match, at least not
entirely.
The relationship becomes less clear when one considers a smaller, but noteworthy
group of studies. Cederblad, Dahlin, Hagnell, and Hansson (1995) found that secular
coping mechanisms were responsible for better mental health, better quality of life, less
psychopathology, and less alcoholism while religious coping mechanisms were virtually
not endorsed and nonessential for one’s better health. This study suggested that secular
coping can be advantageous and does not necessarily co-occur with religious coping
despite religious coping sometimes demonstrating as the most popular method of coping
(Conway, 1985-86). Elsewhere, no mental health differences were found between
secular and religious groups despite the religious participants showing a substantially
large effect (η2 = .68) regarding their use of religious coping (Horning, Davis, Stirrat, and
Cornwell, 2011). Horning et al. is perhaps the only study of its kind that directly
investigated religious and secular coping styles that actually included secular comparison
groups. The authors found very few differences between atheists, agnostics, high
religiousness persons, and low religiousness persons. There was a finding that atheists in
particular, when compared to agnostics and religious participants, evidenced a smallsized effect of being more likely to abuse substances to cope, but this effect did not
achieve statistical significance. Overall, the study found similar rates of secular coping
styles, both adaptive and maladaptive, between religious and secular groups.
The relationship of religious coping with mental health also becomes slightly
muddied by the findings that religious coping is not always a healthy act. Pargament et
al. (1998) showed that certain religious coping styles, such as becoming angry with God
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or feeling punished by God, were associated with poorer mental health. Koenig,
Pargament, and Nielsen (1998) echoed these same findings that negative religious coping
styles were associated with poorer mental health, but the authors also found that most
negative religious coping behaviors were used rather infrequently. In general, though,
religious coping shares an advantageous relationship with one’s mental health.
Although a review of spiritual coping and not a study on its own, Baldacchino and
Draper (2001) concluded that religious or secular identities were less relevant for
determining one’s ability to cope but that maintaining a positive outlook was the crucial
factor across people. Wilkinson and Coleman (2010) found that strong ideological
beliefs helped participants cope effectively through providing consolation and guidance
regardless of whether those beliefs were religious or atheistic in nature. One might
wonder how an ideology like atheism that is essentially doctrine-less would help provide
consolation and guidance. As one 89 year old atheist participant in Wilkinson and
Coleman’s study stated, “[…] what we’ve got here is the here and now. Just make the
best of it, do what we can and live peacefully with everybody that’s prepared to live
peacefully with us.” (p. 350). Coincidentally, one could argue that this atheist’s
statement shares striking similarities to the basis of many religious faiths. Other research
has found that atheists and agnostics resembled their religious counterparts and had
developed a code to live by that matched their own philosophical outlooks (O’Connel &
Skevington, 2005). A comprehensive look at this evidence suggests that distinguishing
between religious or secular identities in isolation does not fully capture the phenomenon,
as other factors, perhaps more cognitive in nature (e.g., ideological strength, attribution
styles), are at play that are actively associated with mental health benefits and deficits.
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Religious and spiritual coping covariates. Previous literature has found several
attributes that tend to covary with religious and spiritual coping. Women, older adults,
and those with lower income tend to derive greater benefits from religious and spiritual
coping than their respective counterparts (Pargament et al., 1990). In regards to
race/ethnic status, studies have indicated greater endorsements of religious and spiritual
coping among African Americans in particular (e.g., Steffen, Hinderliter, Blumenthal, &
Sherwood, 2001). In contrast, the only demographic characteristic Pargament et al.
(2000) found that accounted for a statistically significant amount of variance regarding
whether one further benefitted from religious/spiritual coping or not was identifying as
female.
Religious and spiritual coping strategies have not been directly compared with
measures of dogmatism; however, some studies have examined religious
fundamentalism, a specifically religious form of dogmatism, in conjunction with
religious/spiritual coping. Unfortunately for interpretive considerations, religious
fundamentalism’s relationship with religious/spiritual coping is not clear cut. For
instance, Raiya, Pargament, Mahoney, and Trevino (2008) found that religious
fundamentalism was moderately related to multiple forms of negative religious/spiritual
coping styles (r = .39 to .42) but substantially less related (r = .11) to an indicator of
positive religious/spiritual coping. This particular finding is difficult to make sense of
when previous research has found that both stronger belief systems and positive
religious/spiritual coping are related to better mental health. Based on previous findings,
one would expect the Raiya et al. study to reveal a larger and positive correlation between
fundamentalism and positive religious/spiritual coping with an inverse correlation
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between religious fundamentalism and negative religious/spiritual coping. In a separate
study, participants considered to be religious fundamentalists were twice as likely to
endorse positive religious/spiritual coping behaviors than negative ones (Nooney &
Woodrum, 2002). Further research exploring this relationship is warranted given the
mixed observations.
Dogmatism, Spirituality, and Coping: Methods of Emotional Regulation
Dogmatism, spirituality, and coping are the constructs of interest for this study for
two reasons. First, within the field of psychology of religion and spirituality, these
variables’ relationships to mental health are the most widely studied. More importantly,
these three variables can be understood from a single, but comprehensive theoretical
framework: emotional regulation.
Gross (2008) defined emotional regulation by describing the processes one uses to
modify emotional states. Typically the literature describes processes that are intrinsic in
nature (i.e., what a person does to impact their own emotional state). Emotional
regulation also frequently refers to processes that are aimed at attenuating one’s own
negative emotions, such as anger or sadness (Gross, Richards, & John, 2006).
Conversely, emotional regulation can also take the form of maintaining or magnifying
one’s positive emotions (Langston, 1994), such as joy or tranquility, but this appears less
often. In general, processes can take many forms, such as cognitive or behavioral
strategies to modify one’s emotional state. Cognitively, one might modify their
disappointment after failing a test by mentally focusing on their positive qualities,
assuring themselves that the test performance was a fluke, or converting the sadness to
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anger by silently lambasting the professor’s actions (e.g., “The test questions were poorly
worded!”). In either example the participant was employing cognitive strategies to create
a more preferable emotional experience, be that a more soothed state or as the latter
example showcased, one negative emotion being endorsed because it was preferable to
another emotion.
Behaviorally, one can also regulate and impact one’s emotions. Receiving a
coveted college acceptance letter in the mail may implore a high school senior to prolong
their excitement by telling friends and family the good news who will then share and
reciprocate the happiness, perhaps making the emotional high endure longer and with
greater intensity within the student. Bitterness within a recent divorcee may prompt an
ex-husband to sue for full legal custody of the couple’s children as an attempt of turning
the bitterness into a vengeful sense of triumph over his former wife. While these
examples consist of major events in one’s life, emotional regulation can more often be
seen on a smaller scale in everyday life. Examples include making small talk in an
elevator to ease the awkwardness with another person, honking at the car in front of you
that is reacting slowly to a changed traffic light as a means to ease an angry tension, or
kissing one’s spouse upon returning home after a workday apart to quickly experience
feelings of love and intimacy.
Emotional regulation can also be expanded to understand other major life choices
beyond reactions to major stressors, everyday hassles, and everyday pleasantries. One
could argue that people make decisions, getting married, for example, because they
expect some emotional reward, such as the enjoyment of shared intimacy or perhaps the
sense of contentment derived from attaining the better financial security that marital
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partnership can create. In the same vein, why would a young graduate choose a career in
one profession over another? Arguably because the graduate had a belief that one of
those professions would provide more net pleasure because it would result in more
positive emotions and less negative emotions than the alternative career choice. These
examples are given because these same principles can apply to why one would adopt or
maintain (perhaps subconsciously) a religious, spiritual, or secular identity. Each of these
identities provide an orienting worldview that can help one navigate the complexities of
life via the respective identity’s inherent thinking styles and expected behaviors which
impact emotional outcomes. Religious doctrine guides how one should strive to think
and act, and as described earlier, secular persons adopt their own philosophical outlook as
a guide.
Finally, it is important to note that emotional regulation also affects one’s mental
health. Gross (2008) noted that maladaptive emotional responses are characteristic of
more than half of Axis I disorders and all of the listed Axis II personality disorders listed
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). This finding holds that one’s quality of emotional regulation
strategies affects facets of mental health, such as depressive symptomology or life
satisfaction.
These general principles of emotional regulation can be applied to understand the
roles of cognitive beliefs, like dogmatism, as well as the role of coping strategies and
spirituality. Each of these variables represent constructs that help one regulate their
emotions and resultantly affect mental health.
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Coping. Coping strategies have an obvious fit with emotional regulation,
because, by definition, coping strategies are a response to a stressor. Typically coping is
defined as a response to a negative event and coping strategies are aimed at combating
distress or regaining positive affect. Coping strategies, then, primarily exclude facets of
emotion regulation theories that describe how one increases or maintains positive
emotions but are nonetheless clear indications of emotional regulation processes.
Dogmatism. As defined earlier, dogmatism represents a certainty or strength of
one’s beliefs. It follows that one who is more certain in their belief style is more resistant
to threats from situations or opposing worldviews that threaten the credibility of one’s
own belief. Higher levels of dogmatism may help buffer individuals from stress and
reduce the occurrence of negative affect due to experiences like cognitive dissonance
(Burris et al., 1997). A person who chooses to strongly believe in their ideology may be
effectively emotionally regulating and be less likely to experience psychological distress.
This hypothesis is supported by the previous research discussed that found evidence for a
curvilinear effect between strongly believing religious and secular groups with wavering
belief systems being at a disadvantage.
One distinction regarding terminology that is important to note is theistic/atheistic
certainty versus dogmatism. Previous research that found support for a curvilinear effect
with mental health (e.g., Galen & Kloet, 2010) demonstrated that one’s level of certainty
in God’s existence or nonexistence produced a curvilinear relationship, while other
studies demonstrated the same curvilinear effect by analyzing dogmatic strength levels.
Methods of clarifying dogmatic strength levels varied across studies. For example, Riley
(2005) measured participants’ levels of certainty about general existential issues while
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Ross (1990) had participants state their religious or secular identity and then rate that
identity as being strong, somewhat strong, or not very strong. Theistic/atheistic certainty
can be considered a subtype of dogmatism specifically regarding God’s
existence/nonexistence; however, dogmatism in its general form, is a broad characteristic
that denotes the extent to which one is certain about their beliefs in general, regardless as
to whether those beliefs deal with issues of theism, atheism, or something else entirely
(e.g., political ideals). It is this general form of dogmatism that theoretically contributes
to resiliency against stress and thus may relate to better emotional regulation and
healthier mental states; yet, no study to date has investigated whether dogmatism actually
mediates the relationship between theistic/atheistic certainty and mental health.
Spirituality. Spirituality has been linked with emotional regulation theories in
the past, such as self-control theory (e.g., Ciarrocchi & Brelsford, 2009) and
psychodynamic frameworks (e.g., Gostecnik, Repic, Cvetek, & Cvetek, 2009). Another
applicable emotional regulation perspective, terror management theory (TMT;
Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1986), posits that humans are aware of their
mortality and act or think in ways to compensate with their inevitable deaths. TMT was
formulated in part to explain existential belief patterns and behaviors and is unique when
compared to other emotion regulation theories because its constitution provides a detailed
interpretive lens for the functional roles that religion and spirituality play in one’s life.
According to Vail et al. (2010), TMT states that religious and spiritual beliefs and actions
provide one with a psychological security from the terrifying realism that death awaits us
all. As follows, spirituality and religiousness can be viewed as methods of emotionally
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regulating and in turn may affect one’s mental health depending on the extent of their
endorsement.
Both religious and spiritual ideologies beneficially regulate one’s negative
emotions regarding death by providing what TMT theorists refer to as literal and
symbolic immortality (Dechesne et al., 2003). Religious perspectives often provide
literal immortality by essentially saying, “follow this doctrine and you will live for
eternity.” Symbolic immortality refers to living on by being a part of something that is
larger, important, and lasting beyond a single human’s lifespan. This may be achieved
through an ethnic or nationalistic identity that will endure among a group of people even
after individual members perish but generations of living members persevere. Symbolic
immortality can also be achieved through the common tenets of spirituality. Reflective of
the Chiu et al. (2004) and Fisher (1998) spiritual models discussed earlier, spirituality
involves a sense of connectedness or community that transcends the individual and lives
on. Spirituality, which may or may not include religiousness, can thus provide the
adaptive emotional benefits of literal and/or symbolic immortality, which in turn may
explain mental health differences among individuals. Those who are in a state of
spiritual fulfillment may experience better mental health outcomes, congruent with the
spirituality and mental health empirical findings discussed previously. Even secular
forms of spirituality are likely to provide emotional regulation benefits because the
secular person’s attunement with their spiritual motives of searching for meaning and
purpose in life, living symbiotically with nature, and experiencing a deep connectedness
and bond with humanity (along with many other forms of nonreligious spirituality) would
likely positively affect one’s emotional valence. Fulfillment of such spiritual motives
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would reflect a secular person’s drive for symbolic immortality because these ventures
are potentially impactful beyond the scope of the singular person’s life.
Spirituality differentiates itself as an emotional regulation agent from coping
strategies in that spirituality can act as a remedy for negative emotions (similar to coping
strategies) or as a maintainer/increaser of positive emotions (relatively an overlooked
notion in the literature regarding coping strategies). An example of the former includes
being terminated from one’s job and responding by going on a hike in nature to
experience the splendor and majesty of the environment that is spiritually revitalizing.
An example of the latter is experiencing the blessing that is childbirth and giving thanks
via prayer to a higher power or God for being bestowed with such a gift allowing one to
bask even further in the delight.
Methodological Issues and Considerations for Studying Religiousness and
Spirituality
Sampling. Hwang et al. (2009) discuss that it is a methodological weakness to
not include secular control samples. Producing research that compares high religiousness
participants with lower religiousness participants is not the same as comparing a religious
group with a secular group on mental health outcomes. As an analogy, take the work of
Gamst et al. (2002). The authors found that low Latino ethnic identity levels among
Latino Americans were related to poorer mental health. Should one infer from this study
that Caucasian Americans or Asian Americans conversely have lower mental health due
to the likelihood of them also having low Latino identity levels? That would be an
inaccurate overextension of the findings because Caucasian Americans or Asian
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Americans have their own respective identities that may also be independently associated
with mental health. Likewise, secular identities should be considered separately from
religious identities as they represent a different cultural group.
Another sampling issue inherent in the previous research that hampers the
interpretation of the relationship between mental health and religiousness/spirituality is
that this literature typically reflects Christian research samples. Hood et al. (2009)
reported that much of the psychological study of religion/spirituality is limited to those
who identify as Christian. Thus, the external validity is once again questionable and the
proposed relationships extant within the literature should be considered with skepticism.
It is possible that the relationships are limited to Christians themselves or that Christian
practices in particular are responsible for the mental health associations observed thus far
in the literature. Such findings may or may not be robust when investigated with other
religious groups. Much can be learned by studying other groups with differing practices
and belief systems, such as other religions or secular groups.
Hall, Koenig, and Meador (2008) went so far as to call secularity a “health
liability” despite evidence that supports the contrary. The authors also implied that
secular persons and low religiousness persons are a fairly homogenous group. Hall et al.
have overlooked two things. First, they have disregarded the implications of studies that
were methodologically rigorous enough to use an adequate comparison sample of secular
groups that found the curvilinear relationship detailed previously in this paper.
Moreover, the authors failed to recognize that heterogeneity exists between secular
groups and the less religious. Hwang and colleagues (2009) noted this heterogeneity and
criticized religion and mental health research for lumping together secular groups with
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the less religious when analyzing data. The characteristics of these less religious sample
groups are typically ill defined and their characteristics are poorly measured (e.g., calling
them religious “nones” or religious independents), and by comparing them to the highly
religious is problematic because it does not provide a meaningful basis for comparison
(Hwang et al., 2009). The case for the heterogeneity of secularity in particular is
supported by previous research, such as Hadaway (1989), whose cluster analysis revealed
five differing groups within a sample of apostates who varied in socioeconomic status
indicators, age, political values, family values, and, most notable for the current study,
mental health and existential beliefs. Future research should use indicators that allow for
an observance of diversity within religious and secular groups in order to more accurately
investigate the relationship with mental health variables.
Challenges measuring spirituality. Another glaring issue that has pronounced
itself in the last two decades concerns the studies that have compared spirituality with
mental health variables. Given spirituality’s idiosyncratic nature, finding a single
measure whose definition encompasses a diversity of populations is difficult, and is
perhaps part of the reason why scholars have argued that there is an oversupply of
spirituality scales in the field (Kapuscinski & Masters, 2010). While several scales are
promising, numerous problems exist in many spirituality scale compositions that have
been used in mental health research. Western scholars often create scales that are
particularly suited for Christian samples. The Daily Spiritual Experience Scale
(Underwood & Teresi, 2002), for example, frequently refers to “God” in its items, and
thus may not be situated to measure spirituality levels in nontheistic spiritual persons.
Another aspect that is debated by scholars is whether spirituality measures that include
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the term spirituality should provide a definition of spirituality for the completers. For
example, the Beliefs and Values Scale (King et al., 2006) aims to measure degree of
spiritual beliefs and includes such items as “I am a spiritual person” and “At least once in
my life, I have had an intense spiritual experience.” What nature of spirituality these
items are actually tapping across individuals is not obvious. Echoing the construct
validity concerns of Hwang et al. (2009), not clearly providing definitions of spirituality
after using the term spirituality in an item makes it difficult to conclude that the
researchers measured the same construct in participant A as they did with participant B
even though their responses were identical. In contrast, it can be argued that spirituality
is idiosyncratic by nature, and by keeping the definition ambiguous the completer can
make their own personally relevant interpretations regarding spiritual aspects in item
content which may also be useful for researchers to study spirituality’s interrelationships
with other variables.
Despite these debatable properties among scales, the salient issue that merits
focus is that numerous spirituality scales being used overlap as measures of well-being.
The most popular spiritual well-being scale, the Spiritual Well-being Scale (Paloutzian &
Ellison, 1982), aims to measure existential and religious well-being. Items include
statements like “I feel that life is a positive experience” and “I feel very fulfilled and
satisfied with life.” As Koenig (2008) implied, these items could have just as easily
ended up on questionnaires aiming to measure general psychological well-being and
could be representative of a construct completely independent of spirituality. Even after
using a strict inclusion criteria for their review, de Jager Meezenbroeck et al. (2010)
found that about half of the spirituality measures they collected contained items that
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overlapped with psychological well-being. These shortcomings in measuring spirituality
taint the validity of previous researchers’ conclusions that spirituality is associated with
mental health. For the relationship with mental health to be accurately investigated, one
must use a spirituality measure that is distinct from well-being and simultaneously able to
encompass diverse groups.
Covariates. There are other methodological factors that add to the complexity of
investigating religiousness/spirituality and secularity’s relationships with mental health
and merit discussion. Covariates that may, in varying degrees, partly explain effects on
mental health have also been given attention in the literature. To regard the relationship
between religion and mental health as a clear cut, linear connection would be an
oversimplification as other influences may be present. Koenig and Larson (2001) found
that 90% of patients reported they used religion to cope with stress but a similar sample
hailing from another geographic location found that only 55% of their patients responded
with this same coping style (Ringdal, 1996). Gee and Veevers (1990) discovered with
their sample that the positive relationship between religious involvement and life
satisfaction weakened or even reversed when geographic location was considered.
Females, African Americans, and elderly persons in general tend to value religion more
highly when compared to their cultural counterparts (Newport, 2006). Further, these
cultural attributes may alter the relationship between mental health and
religiousness/spirituality. For example, Crawford, Handal, and Weiner (1989) found that
religiousness among females, but not for males, was positively related to life satisfaction
and lower psychological distress. Mirola (1999) echoed similar findings by
demonstrating that religious involvement was negatively related to depression for females
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but no such relationship was found for males. Ellison (1991) found that life satisfaction
was related to higher levels of certainty in one’s religious faith and this relationship was
stronger among individuals with less formal education. Overall, numerous cultural and
social factors may partially filter the relationship between religiousness and mental
health, and in turn these factors may affect the type of relationship that spirituality shares
with mental health when one considers religiousness as a subcategory of spirituality.
Another covariate that must be parsed out to more fully clarify the relationship
between mental health and religiousness/spirituality is the role of social support. Greater
levels of social support have been shown to associate with higher levels of mental health
(Fiori & Denckla, 2012). Additionally, it has been posited that associating with a
religious group creates an environment where one is socially supported (Oman & Reed,
1998). Restated, associating regularly with a supportive group of people may serve as a
protective factor against stressful or traumatic events, which may, in part, explain one’s
mental health levels on its own. Such findings add importance to distinguishing whether
a positive effect on mental health exists specifically due to religious aspects or due to the
beneficial nature of social support in general.
Unstudied interrelationships. A final opportunity for exploration that has not
yet been investigated thoroughly is the relative strength of effects with mental health
among spirituality, coping styles, and dogmatism. The research described thus far most
often highlights just one of these variables’ relationship with mental health. In contrast,
simultaneous inclusion of all these variables in a statistical analysis can help pinpoint
both the overlap and the unique effects that each of these variables may share with mental
health. It is possible that these variables may possess salient relationships in a univariate
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context but this relationship may disappear when the variance of other variables is
considered. Simultaneously, a multivariate analysis could illustrate the size of the effects
of these variables and clarify whether these effects possess strengths that are still relevant
when other variables are also in consideration.
Taken together, the relationship between mental health and religion/spirituality is
highly nuanced. The manner in which mental health, religiousness, and spirituality are
defined, as well as considerations regarding sample makeup, cultural factors, analytical
strategies, and known covariates may also affect how relationships manifest, if at all.
Research exploring these intricate phenomena would benefit from considering these
issues in order to expand on the current scholarly discourse.
The Current Study
Participants identifying as religious and secular were compared to investigate
relationships between the variables of interest; namely, mental health, dogmatism,
theistic/atheistic certainty, spiritual harmony, and religious/spiritual coping. Mental
health in the following hypotheses refers to the variables of positive affect, negative
affect, life satisfaction, hope, gratitude, and altruism. In testing the relationship between
one’s belief strength with mental health, it was hypothesized that greater levels of
theistic/atheistic certainty, regardless of the theistic or atheistic leaning, would positively
predict levels of mental health (Hypothesis 1a). Additionally, the participants with the
strongest levels of theistic-oriented certainty and atheistic-oriented certainty (as denoted
by the first item of this variable’s scale), would have similar levels of mental health
(Hypothesis 1b). Dogmatism was also hypothesized to mediate the relationship between
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one’s theistic/atheistic certainty and mental health after controlling for educational level,
gender, social support, and self-presentation bias (Hypothesis 1c). Religious and spiritual
coping styles were expected to account for significant amounts of the variance in mental
health, with higher endorsements of religious and spiritual coping styles predicting
greater mental health levels, for both participants who self-identify as religious
(Hypothesis 2a) and secular (Hypothesis 2b) when controlling for the influences of
gender, race/ethnicity, age, income level, geographic location, social support, and selfpresentation bias. Spiritual harmony was hypothesized to account for significant amounts
of the variance in mental health, with greater values of spiritual harmony predicting better
mental health among both the religious participants (Hypothesis 3a) and those who
identified as secular (Hypothesis 3b) after controlling for social support and selfpresentation bias.
It is important to clarify that Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c used the theistic/atheistic
certainty levels to clarify the strength and nature of one’s beliefs, while Hypotheses 2a,
2b, 3a, and 3b, used each participant’s self-identified ideological affiliation that may be
secular or religious in nature (e.g., agnosticism, Islam, etc.). This distinction is necessary
because the first set of hypotheses focused on strength of beliefs specifically while the
second and third set of hypotheses investigated relationships via one’s self-ascribed
religious or secular identity. Also, this allowed for better interpretive possibilities
because it separated belief strength from identity status. For example, one could indicate
high levels of theism on the theistic/atheistic certainty measure, but they may not be
religious (e.g., people who identify as spiritual but not religious). While there may have
been overlaps between being theistic and also being religious, using the variables
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separately allowed for more accurate testing of the hypotheses and prevented
overextensions of the findings.
An exploratory research question with no formal hypothesis was also
investigated. What variables (i.e., dogmatism, theistic/atheistic certainty,
religious/spiritual coping, or spiritual harmony) constitute the strongest and weakest
predictors of mental health among participants, was also investigated. While these
variables have been studied separately regarding their relationship to mental health, no
study had analyzed them simultaneously in a multivariate context to determine the
relative strengths of their effects.
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CHAPTER II
METHODS
Sample
An online sample was recruited via contacting various special groups through
community forums such as Facebook.com and Reddit.com. Facebook group pages that
were invited to participate included group pages devoted to agnosticism, atheism,
Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and spirituality. Group memberships ranged from 6,000 to
30,000. Reddit subforums receive random internet traffic, but each forum also has
subscribers. The subforums for agnosticism, atheism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism and
spirituality were invited to participate and each subforum ranges from 1,500 to over one
million subscribers. A “snowball” component was also used so that these initial
participants were encouraged to send the survey link to others they felt appropriate.
Gosling, Vazire, Srivastave, & John (2004) found that online completion of self-report
measures can produce consistent results with en vivo presentations and are apt at
acquiring diverse sample memberships which helps ensure greater external validity.
Measures
Theistic/Atheistic certainty. Participants were asked to indicate how certain
they were regarding God’s existence or nonexistence. Strong theism is represented by
those who endorse the statement “Absolutely certain God exists” (score of 3).
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Subsequent possible responses were “Mostly certain God exists” (2), “Somewhat certain
God exists” (1), “God’s existence or nonexistence is unknowable” (0), “I am unsure
about whether God exists or not” (0), “Somewhat certain God does not exist” (-1)
“Mostly certain God does not exist” (-2) and “Absolutely certain God does not exist” (3). Dawkins (2006) theorized a similar metric, and Galen and Kloet (2010) also used a
similar metric in their empirical study with analogous research questions to the current
study. One difference of the current theistic/atheistic certainty metric with Galen and
Kloet’s is the inclusion of the option “God’s existence or nonexistence is unknowable”
because this response reflects an additional type and definition that encompasses agnostic
beliefs (Zuckerman, 2009) that is distinctive from those who are agnostic because they
are doubtful.
This metric needed to serve as both a categorical indicator (i.e., are beliefs
theistic, atheistic, or agnostic in nature) and as a continuous variable of belief certainty.
To expand the theistic/atheistic certainty variable into a continuous form to study its
linear relationship with other variables more clearly, three items were added.
Measurements of the responses to the initial prompt “Regarding God’s existence OR
nonexistence: 2) my beliefs are correct and represent truth; 3) I consider my beliefs to be
strong; 4) there is nothing that could convince me differently” were gathered. Agreement
with these statements was indicated via an 8-point likert scale. In sum, item 1 of the
theistic/atheistic certainty scale assessed for both certainty levels (via the absolute value
of the response score) and the ideological leaning, while items 2, 3, and 4 assessed for
certainty levels only. To create a composite scale with equally weighted items, the 0 to 3
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absolute values of the first item were converted to an 8-point likert metric using the
transformation procedure outlined by Dawes (2008).
Dogmatism. Altemeyer’s (1996) DOG scale was used to measure dogmatism
and is defined to measure “unchangeable, unjustified certainty” about the correctness of
one’s beliefs regarding important general life matters. There are 20 item responses
reported in a 9-point Likert format. An example item is “I am so sure I am right about
the important things in life, there is no evidence that could convince me otherwise.”
Altemeyer (1996) found that the scale had a Cronbach’s α of .90. The scale’s strong
predictive and construct validities have also been demonstrated in several studies
(Altemeyer, 2002; Crowson, 2009; Crowson, DeBacker, & Davis, 2007).
Religious/Spiritual coping use. Religious/spiritual coping use was measured by
the religious/spirituality subscale from the Brief COPE (Carver, 1997), an abbreviated
version of the COPE Inventory (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). The 2 items
consisted of statements asking participants to rate how frequently they enact certain
religious/spiritual coping styles to deal with negative events via 4-point Likert response
options. A sample item includes “I try to find comfort in my religious or spiritual
beliefs.” The Brief COPE is frequently used in the coping literature and has also been
used with a similar sample of secular and religious participants (Horning et al., 2011).
Horning et al.’s study found α coefficients of .92 for this subscale.
Due to the brevity of the Brief COPE subscale, an additional subscale was used to
increase the encapsulation of religious and spiritual coping styles and better understand
their interrelationships with other variables. Two of three items from the spiritual
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connection subscale of the long form version of the Brief RCOPE (Pargament, 1999)
were also used. The third item of this subscale was excluded because it specifically uses
the term “God” and thus would not be fitting for all participants. The Brief RCOPE also
uses a 4-point Likert response option that has participants rate the frequency they use a
coping style. A sample item includes “Thought about how my life is part of a larger
spiritual force.” Pargament et al. (2000) found that the three item version of the scale had
an α coefficient of .81.
Spiritual harmony. The Spiritual Health And Life Orientation Measure
(SHALOM; Fisher, 2010) asks participants to rate 20 5-point Likert items twice each in
response to two general questions (totaling 40 responses) that allow for a calculation of
one’s spiritual harmony levels. The first general question asks participants to rate
whether each of the 20 items’ content (e.g., “Developing a personal relationship with the
Divine/God”) is important for one’s spiritual health and the second general question asks
the participant the extent that item’s content is actually being experienced by the
participant. This latter question regarding one’s lived experience comprises a separate
scale has undergone research under the name of the Spiritual Well-Being Questionnaire
(SWBQ; Gomez & Fisher, 2003). The SHALOM measure (both general questions
included) and SWBQ measure (lived experience question only) are directly based off
Fisher’s (1998) spiritual health model and their 20 items reflect Fisher’s four domains of
personal, communal, environmental, and transcendental spiritual health (five items per
domain). The SHALOM, used for the current study, is arguably more suitable for diverse
populations when compared to other spirituality scales because its dual response system
allows a person to essentially define their idea of spiritual health by rating whether they
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agree that an item’s content is important for spiritual health and then rate how well they
live up to their own standard of spiritual health. Thereby the idiosyncrasies of each
person are accounted for and issues such as the use of religious terminology (e.g., “God”)
are bypassed because participants are not forced to endorse or disregard what they do not
believe exists or is not pertinent. A discrepancy score can then be calculated that reflects
the disparity between one’s ideal state of spiritual health and their reported lived
experience of spirituality (meaning a score of zero represents the highest level of spiritual
harmony). Thus, spiritual harmony is measured inversely, but for the purposes of this
study the data was transformed with reverse coding to make the statistics more easily
interpretable. Fisher and Brumley (2006) suggested that a mean difference of 1.0 or
greater between lived experience and spiritual health ideals for a given domain represents
spiritual dissonance or lower spiritual harmony. Restated, high levels of spiritual
harmony mean the participants’ responses for each item were strongly similar between
what they believe to be ideal for one’s spiritual health and whether they lived in
accordance with that ideal.
The predecessor of the SHALOM measure that possesses identical content items,
the SWBQ, has evidenced strong internal consistency (α = .92), construct validity,
convergent validity with other spirituality scales (r = .49), and a theoretically consistent
factor structure (Gomez & Fisher, 2003). Item response theory analyses have also
yielded mostly favorable results but have isolated a select few items that would benefit
from further improvement (Gomez & Fisher, 2005). In a content review of several
notable spirituality measures, including the Spiritual Transcendence Scale (Piedmont,
1999) and the Spirituality Assessment Scale (Howden, 1992), de Jager Meezenbroek et
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al. (2010) stated, “If one were to apply all our criteria, the Spiritual Well-being
Questionnaire (SWBQ) of Gomez and Fisher (2003) proves most promising” (p. 14).
Regarding the fulfillment of de Jager Meezenbroek et al.’s criteria, they elaborated that
the SWBQ was suitable for religiously diverse populations because it does not exclude
people based on their religious or nonreligious identity. The authors also detailed that the
SWBQ, despite its misleading name, only has one item that conceptually overlaps with a
psychological well-being construct (“Developing joy in life”) which also means that the
SHALOM measure as a whole is better equipped to tap into a spirituality construct that is
largely distinct from psychological well-being.
A modification to this scale was made for the current study so that participants
could respond with “Not Applicable.” This change was necessary because no
applicability is a meaningfully different response type than the current low anchor on the
scale, “Very Low.” This allowed for participants to differentiate whether the item’s
content was actually reflective of their beliefs and actions and to what degree it was
reflective. It is also important to note that in the slightly infrequent case that a participant
marked a spiritual ideal item lower than its correspondent lived experience item the
discrepancy score was converted to 0 (to reflect that the person was actually still
experiencing an optimal level of spiritual harmony for that item pair). This was done to
treat spiritual ideals as a threshold that one meets, and surpassing that threshold does not
have negative consequences for one’s spiritual health, unlike falling short of meeting
one’s spiritual ideal threshold, which would theoretically relate to negative consequences
for one’s spiritual health. Finally, minor modifications to the wording of the scale’s
items and directions were made to uphold the intent of the original pencil and paper
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format of the scale (the pencil and paper format used a side by side column format for the
ideal and experiential corresponding items, which could not be replicated on the survey
website). The conversion from the physical format to the electronic survey format
required that items be converted to complete sentences to make each item more readable
and understandable to respondents.
Mental health. Six scales were used to tap into multiple areas assessing mental
health. The Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988) is a common measure used in psychological research to measure mood
over a researcher’s chosen time frame (e.g., the past week, the past year). The time frame
chosen for the current study asked participants to rate their affect in the last month in
order to capture an additional time frame separate from the other mental health measures
used in the current study. The PANAS is comprised of two scales of 10 words each that
relate to either positive or negative affect and are endorsed on a 5-point Likert scale.
Watson et al. found Cronbach’s α coefficients ranging from .84 to .88 across each scale
for the multiple timeframes posed. Expected convergent and discriminant validity
directionalities with related mental health measures, such as the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI) were also found. The BDI demonstrated a correlation of r=.58 with the
negative affect scale and r=-.36 with the positive affect scale.
The Gratitude Questionnaire-6 (GQ-6; McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002)
was used to measure one’s dispositional gratitude levels. Six 7-point Likert style items
ask participants to indicate the extent of their agreement with statements about one’s
level of gratitude, appreciation, and thankfulness. McCullough et al. found adequate
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internal consistency (α = .82) and evidence for discriminant validity from other mental
health variables.
The Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1991) consists of 8 items that assess one’s
perceived successful agency and the ability to pursue one’s goals. A 4-point Likert scale
is used to indicate the extent to which each statement describes the participant. Snyder
et al. found adequate internal consistency (α = .74-84), temporal stability (r = .73-.85),
and evidence for convergent and discriminant validity. Roesch and Vaughn (2006) also
found that the scale’s factor structure was stable across diverse ethnic groups.
The Prosocialness Scale for Adults (PSA; Caprara, Steca, Zelli, & Capanna,
2005) was used to measure an altruistic orientation among participants. The 16 items
tapped both behavioral and feelings associated with altruism and participants indicated
how truthfully each statement described them through a 5-point Likert scale. Caprara et
al. noted that the PSA had previously evidenced strong psychometric qualities from a
classical test theory perspective in previous research, and then went on to demonstrate
that the PSA possessed strong discriminant and informative capabilities through item
response theory procedures.
The final indicator of mental health was the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS;
Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). This five item scale is designed to assess
one’s global sense of overall life satisfaction through its 7-point Likert rating system. Its
subjective nature is beneficial as it allows participants to rate their satisfaction based on
their own criteria. This scale has been used as an indicator of mental health in similar
works to the current study (e.g., Galen & Kloet, 2010; Horning et al., 2010). Pavot and
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Diener (1993) found strong evidence supporting adequate reliability and validity, such as
the scale’s temporal stability that maintained across two week (r=.83) and four year
(r=.54) intervals and its discriminant validity that was found with other measures of
mental health such as the BDI (r=-.72)
Social support. A slightly modified version of the Social Support Questionnaire6 (SSQ6; Sarason, Sarason, Shearin, & Pearce, 1987) was used. Six items were used to
assess participants’ satisfaction with their social support system in regards to their
supports’ acceptance, dependability, and ability to respond to one’s negative emotional
states. A total number of supports available was also asked. Sarason et al. found that the
SSQ6 correlated expectedly with mental health indicators (r=-.49 with a measure of
loneliness) and possessed good internal reliability (α=.90 to .93).
Self-presentation bias. Evidence exists that special groups may engage in
socially desirable responding that can introduce error into data collection procedures
(e.g., Presser & Stinson, 1998). In regards to the current study, because anonymous
completion of the measures would not prevent an omnipresent God figure from knowing
a theistic person’s answers, socially desirable responding may occur in spite of the
anonymous conditions. Ballard’s (1992) Scale 1 short form version of the MarloweCrowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was used to assess for selfpresentation bias and socially desirable responding. Loo and Loewn’s (2004) factor
analytic procedures deemed Ballard’s version as an improvement over the original
version but its internal reliability is lower than what is psychometrically desirable at
α=.64.
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Religiousness and Spirituality. Two separate questions asked questions to
indicate on a 10-point Likert scale how religious they considered themselves and how
spiritual they considered themselves, respectively. These items were not used for
hypothesis testing but were included to test whether other variables were related to these
measures expectedly.
Demographic characteristics. Due to the potential covariates described in
multiple sections, demographic characteristics that may also moderate relationships with
mental health variables were also inquired: geographic location, gender, race/ethnicity,
age, education level, and income.
Data Analyses
Pearson’s r correlations were calculated to analyze the predictive relationship
strength between theistic/atheistic certainty (by using the absolute value of the response
to item 1, in conjunction with the values of responses to items 2, 3, and 4 on the
theistic/atheistic certainty scale) and mental health variables to investigate Hypothesis 1a.
For Hypothesis 1b, participants who indicated on item 1 of the theistic/atheistic certainty
scale the strongest levels of theism (scores of 3) or the strongest levels of atheism (scores
of -3) will be compared in regards to their scores for each of the mental health variables
via MANCOVA tests and Pillai’s trace statistics. Demographic characteristics and other
covariates (i.e., age, gender, geographic location, income, education level, social support,
and self-presentation bias) that are statistically relevant contributors to theistic/atheistic
certainty and mental health were included as the covariates in the analyses. Pillai’s trace
was used as it is considered to be more robust against departures from normally

51

distributed data (Field, 2006). If significant differences were indicated, then follow up
ANCOVA tests with Bonferroni adjustments were conducted to distinguish if specific
differences existed by group membership. Cohen’s d effect sizes (Cohen, 1988) were
calculated to clarify the magnitude of group differences.
For Hypothesis 1c, structural equation modeling was used to test dogmatism’s
mediating relationship between one’s level of theistic/atheistic beliefs (all four items
including the absolute values of responses to item 1) and mental health. Structural
equation modeling allows for the estimation of both direct and indirect mediating effects
and is useful for analyses that include latent constructs, such as mental health. Model fit
(for this hypothesis and all subsequent hypotheses and explorations) was assessed
through the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), comparative fit Index (CFI), and root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA) tests. RMSEA values less than .10 (Browne &
Cudeck, 1993), along with its 90% confidence interval, and CFI and TLI values greater
than .90 (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004), were used to indicate anywhere from good to
marginal model fit to the data. Missing data were handled via multiple imputation
methods. Wayman (2003) argued that multiple imputation is superior to other forms of
addressing missing data, such as mean imputation and case-wise deletion, that can
sometimes bias results by introducing error. The measurement model for the constructs
was tested initially to ensure adequate fit for usage with the current and subsequent
hypotheses testing. As shown in Figure 4’s depiction of Hypothesis 1c, mediation was
estimated by analyzing the path from the theistic/atheistic certainty variable to
dogmatism, a path conducted from dogmatism to the mental health construct, as well as a
direct path between theistic/atheistic certainty and the mental health construct.
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Figure 4. Hypothesis 1c model.
For Hypotheses 2a, and 2b, a multi-group analysis of a structural equation model
was tested between religious participants and secular participants to determine whether a
latent construct of religious/spiritual coping strategies predicted the latent construct of
mental health, as shown in Figure 5. A measurement model at the item level for
religious/spiritual coping construct was tested initially to ensure adequate fit for the
analyses. To account for possible moderating effects described in previous works,
gender, race/ethnicity, geographic location, the interaction between age and
religious/spiritual coping, the interaction between income level and religious/spiritual
coping were also included in the model. Additionally, recruitment source was also used
as a possible moderator to account for differences between users that were recruited
through differing channels.
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Figure 5. Hypotheses 2a and 2b model.
Hypotheses 3a and 3b were also tested through a multi-group structural equation
model between religious and secular participants. A causal path from spiritual harmony
onto the latent construct of mental health was calculated. Figure 6 illustrates this model.

Figure 6. Hypotheses 3a and 3b model.
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To answer the exploratory research question described earlier, the independent
variables of dogmatism, religious/spiritual coping, spiritual harmony, and the full version
of the theistic/atheistic certainty scale were used in a structural equation model to denote
the relative predictive strengths for each of the variables onto the latent construct of
mental health, as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Exploratory research question model
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Sample and Recruitment
The internet recruitment strategy resulted in 7,538 respondents, 7,338 of whom
gave consent. Of those who gave consent, 4,667 (62%) were included in the final
sample, which is the number reflected in each of the following tables unless otherwise
noted. The most common reason for exclusion were participants who gave consent but
proceeded not to complete any or most of the questions that followed (n = 2,579, or 34%
of the original respondent pool). Other reasons that resulted in exclusion were indicating
an age younger than 18 (n = 31, < 1%), failing to correctly respond to all of the validity
check questions embedded within the survey (n = 58, < 1%), and submitting duplicate
responses under the same IP address (n = 3, < 1%).
In regards to the final sample, the mean age was 27.4 (SD = 10.5), and ranged
from 18 to 86 years of age. The gender distribution favored those that identified as male,
amounting to 60.7% (n = 2,831) of the sample, followed by females, who constituted
28.4% (n = 1,327), with genderqueer participants, the third most numerous group,
accounting for 1.1% (n = 52). Intersex, questioning, transgender females, transgender
males, and those who marked other, made up an additional 1.2% while non-responders to
this question constituted the remaining 8.6% of the gender makeup. Most participants
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were recruited via group forums from Reddit.com (73%, n = 3,405), followed by
Facebook.com (14%, n = 653). Recruitment methods such as Craigslist, e-mail
communication from a participant, and other internet sources comprised 4.6%, while the
non-responders to this question made up the remaining 8.4%. Table 1 provides
additional demographic information of the final sample.
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Table 1
Additional Demographic Information

Characteristic

%

Race/Ethnicity
78.2%
3.3%
3.1%
3.0%
3.9%
8.5%
Annual Income
Less than $20,000
21.8%
$20,000-29,999
10.8%
$30,000-49,999
15.6%
$50,000-74,999
15.2%
$75,000-99,999
10.4%
Greater than $100,000
16.8%
Missing
9.4%
Education Level
Less than high school
1.4%
High school
11.4%
Some college
31.8%
Associate’s
5.9%
Bachelor’s
27.4%
Master’s
10.8%
Doctoral
2.7%
Missing
9.0%
Geographic Location
West U.S.
16.5%
Midwest U.S.
16.1%
Southwest U.S.
8.7%
Southeast U.S.
12.3%
Northeast U.S.
13.9%
Not continental U.S.
16.5%
Missing
16.1%
Ideology
Atheism
37.2%
Agnosticism
19.8%
Christianity
11.0%
Spiritual, nonreligious
10.5%
Buddhism
3.1%
Judaism
1.2%
Islam
0.6%
Hindu
0.3%
Other
7.9%
Missing
8.2%
Note. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Caucasian/White
Biracial/Multiracial
Asian
Hispanic/Latino/Latina
Other
Missing
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N
3,650
154
143
141
182
397
1,018
502
728
710
484
784
441
65
530
1484
277
1,278
506
127
400
768
750
407
572
650
769
751
1,738
926
514
489
146
58
29
15
367
385

Statistical Assumptions
The assumption of normality was assessed visually to ascertain whether the data
was distributed normally. Visual checks were performed in lieu of traditional statistical
tests because the large sample size hindered the interpretive capabilities of tests, such as
calculating skewness and kurtosis values, as well as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which
is prone to indicating non-normality in samples larger than n = 200 even when the data
actually resembles a normal distribution (Field, 2009). Visual inspection revealed that
responses for each variable reflected normal distributions with two exceptions. The
religious/spiritual coping scale was positively skewed, indicating a generally low
endorsement of these coping styles across the sample overall. The gratitude scale was
negatively skewed, indicating that a large portion of the sample tended to experience high
levels of gratitude. These variables, along with the others, were evaluated for normality
violations at the group level since group comparisons were being made to test most of the
aforementioned hypotheses. Specifically, in accordance with Hypothesis 1b, the
strongest theistically and atheistically certain group distributions were examined more
closely as well as each religious and secular identity (for identities with at least n = 30
because at this numerical threshold participant data is more likely to approximate a
normal distribution; Field, 2009) because these identifiers would be pertinent for testing
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b. Further visual inspection revealed that the gratitude
variable was negatively skewed across all religious and secular groups. The
religious/spiritual coping variable was positively skewed for only those who identified as
atheist or agnostics, suggesting that it was these groups in particular that used these
copings styles infrequently, which was consistent with conceptual expectations.
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In regards to homogeneity of variance, Levene’s test was too sensitive to be used
informatively because of the sample size, and Hartley’s FMAX test was inappropriate due
to the differences between group sample sizes. Consequently, the residuals were visually
inspected for patterns and those that were found to potentially violate this assumption
were found to be consistent with theoretical expectations (e.g., participants who identified
as agnostic showed narrower dispersion on the theistic/atheistic certainty scale as it had
only two options that typified agnostic beliefs, while theists and atheists had at least three
options that were applicable). Square root, logarithmic, and reciprocal data
transformations were explored but follow up testing evidenced that the transformed data
created further anomalies (e.g., highly compressed variances) that tarnished the
interpretability of subsequent group comparisons.
Outliers for each of the variables were identified through Tukey’s (1977) method
with various conventional levels of g (i.e., g = 2.2, then subsequently tested at g = 3).
Outliers identified by the method were temporarily removed from the data set to test
whether they would impact statistical testing. The removal of outliers using any level of
g made no impact on the follow up testing so the outliers were reinserted into the data set.
During a separate attempt to ascertain their impact, outliers were identified by
determining scores beyond ±3 standard deviations from the mean. They were each
transformed to a value of ±3 standard deviations but this method also proved to not make
a practical difference in the follow up statistical tests that were done. Taken together,
transforming outliers identified by either of these approaches proved inconsequential in
follow up testing. As such, these changes to the dataset were reversed and the data as a
whole were left untransformed in order to represent the participants’ actual responses.
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Multiple imputation was conducted in order to correct for missing values that
occurred at random. Missing values constituted 4.48% of the data set. Following the
suggestion of Bodner (2008), one imputation was create for each percentage of missing
data, resulting in five imputed data sets that were used in the subsequent analyses. In
sum, not including the inserted values from multiple imputation, the data was left
untransformed and reflected participants’ original responses.
Hypothesis Testing
Tables 2 and 3 include information on the Pearson’s r correlations as well as the
means and standard deviations of the measured variables. Table 4 provides the reliability
estimates of the scales used for the current study. Table 5 provides the variable means
separated by ideological affiliation for groups with at least 30 respondents.
Table 2
Correlations
TAC
TAC

Dog.
.51**

S. Sup.

SPB

SH

Grat.

L. Sat.

Hope

P. Aff.

N. Aff.

.06**

.04**

.16**

.05**

.09**

.09**

.12**

-.08**

.02

.03*

.02

.07**

.13**

-.04*

.07**

.00

.03

-.09**

-.05**

.11**

.13**

.37**

.46**

.47**

.34**

.38**

-.27**

.26**

.10**

.20**

.14**

.18**

.18**

.15**

-.31**

.22**

-.02

.32**

.41**

.35**

.40**

-.32**

.18**

-.01

.56**

.46**

.47**

-.22**

.40**

.22**

.55**

.47**

-.38**

.19**

.11**

.57**

-.28**

.33**

.12**

-.12**

.35**

.15**

.03*

.03*

Dog.

.51**

S. Sup.

.06**

.02

SPB

.04**

.07**

.13**

SH

.16**

.13**

.37**

.20**

Grat.

.05**

-.04*

.46**

.14**

.32**

L. Sat.

.09**

.07**

.47**

.18**

.41**

.56**

Hope

.09**

.00

.34**

.18**

.35**

.46**

.55**

P. Aff.

.12**

.03

.38**

.15**

.40**

.47**

.47**

.57**

N. Aff.

-.08**

-.09**

-.27**

-.31**

-.32**

-.22 **

-.38**

-.28**

-.12**

Alt.

.02

-.05**

.26**

.22**

.18**

.40**

.19**

.33**

.35**

.03*

RSC

.03*

.11**

.10**

-.016

-.01

.22**

.11**

.12**

.15**

.03*

Alt.

RSC

.23**
.23**

Note. TAC = Theistic/Atheistic Certainty; Dog. = Dogmatism; S. Sup. = Social Support
Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; SH = Spiritual Harmony; Grat. = Gratitude;
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L. Sat. = Life Satisfaction; P. Aff. = Positive Affect; N. Aff. = Negative Affect; Alt. =
Altruism; RSC = Religious/Spiritual Coping.
*p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed.
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations
Variable
M (SD)
Possible Range
Theistic/Atheistic Certainty 5.07 (1.55)
1 to 7
Dogmatism
3.09 (1.10)
1 to 9
Social Support Satisfaction
3.62 (0.81)
1 to 5
Self-Presentation Bias
.41 (0.22)
0 to 1
Spiritual Harmony
-12.04 (8.68)
-100 to 0
Gratitude
5.67 (0.96)
1 to 7
Life Satisfaction
4.34 (1.41)
1 to 7
Hope
3.06 (0.46)
1 to 4
Positive Affect
3.38 (0.76)
1 to 5
Negative Affect
2.40 (0.84)
1 to 5
Altruism
3.67 (0.68)
1 to 5
Religious/Spiritual Coping
1.81 (0.84)
1 to 4
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Table 4
Reliability Estimates of Scales
Scale
Cronbach’s α
Theistic/Atheistic Certainty
.73
Dogmatism
.87
Social Support Satisfaction
.89
Self-Presentation Bias
.70
Gratitude
.79
Life Satisfaction
.85
Hope
.83
Positive Affect
.88
Negative Affect
.89
Altruism
.91
Religious/Spiritual Coping
.83
Communal(I)
.88
Communal(E)
.85
Transcendent(I)
.97
Transcendent(E)
.96
Environmental(I)
.86
Environmental(E)
.85
Personal(I)
.76
Personal(E)
.80
Note. Scales with “(I)” and “(E)” at the end are referring to either the spiritual harmony
ideals subscale or the spiritual harmony lived experience subscale, respectively.
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Table 5
Variable Means and Standard Deviations by Ideological Affiliation
TAC

Dog.

S.
Sup.

SPB

SH

Grat.

L.
Sat.

Hope

P.
Aff.

N.
Aff.

Alt.

RSC

Agnosticism

4.06
(1.28)

2.70
(.75)

3.55
(.80)

.39
(.21)

-13.53
(8.52)

5.56
(.92)

4.10
(1.43)

2.98
(.45)

3.26
(.76)

2.52
(.82)

3.62
(.67)

1.65
(.65)

Atheism

5.66
(1.13)

3.19
(1.01)

3.62
(.79)

.41
(.22)

-10.12
(7.43)

5.59
(.97)

4.34
(1.39)

3.06
(.45)

3.40
(.76)

2.33
(.83)

3.60
(.79)

1.39
(.58)

Buddhism

4.53
(1.65)

2.90
(.96)

3.53
(.87)

.41
(.22)

-13.92
(10.85)

5.71
(1.00)

4.38
(1.53)

3.08
(.52)

3.39
(.78)

2.43
(.90)

3.77
(.67)

2.49
(.77)

Christianity

6.02
(1.66)

3.86
(1.54)

3.78
(.80)

.41
(.22)

-13.27
(10.13)

6.03
(.90)

4.58
(1.40)

3.11
(.42)

3.48
(.72)

2.37
(.85)

3.79
(.66)

2.67
(.85)

Judaism

4.92
(1.34)

3.33
(1.11)

3.64
(.75)

.39
(.22)

-14.40
(11.84)

5.75
(.95)

4.51
(1.33)

3.16
(.42)

3.35
(.77)

2.50
(.87)

3.76
(.63)

2.15
(.84)

Spiritual nonreligious

4.34
(1.53)

2.81
(.93)

3.67
(.81)

.42
(.22)

-13.37
(9.34)

5.86
(.91)

4.54
(1.39)

3.10
(.46)

3.44
(.80)

2.40
(.82)

3.78
(.67)

2.37
(.85)

Note. TAC = Theistic/Atheistic Certainty; Dog. = Dogmatism; S. Sup. = Social Support
Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; SH = Spiritual Harmony; Grat. = Gratitude;
L. Sat. = Life Satisfaction; P. Aff. = Positive Affect; N. Aff. = Negative Affect; Alt. =
Altruism; RSC = Religious/Spiritual Coping.
Hypothesis 1a. This hypothesis posited that higher levels of theistic/atheistic
certainty would positively predict mental health. Partial support for this hypothesis was
found while controlling for the variance contributed by social support satisfaction,
income level, age, gender, recruitment channel, race/ethnicity, geographic region, and
education level. There was a statistically significant relationship between the
theistic/atheistic certainty level with life satisfaction, pr = .06, p < .01(two-tailed); hope,
pr = .05, p < .01(two-tailed); and positive affect, pr = .09, p < .01(two-tailed). Each of
these would be considered less than a small-sized effect as they did not meet the
traditional cutoff of pr = .10 (Cohen, 1988). The statistically nonsignificant results were
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as follows: gratitude, pr = .00, p = .83(two-tailed); negative affect, pr = -.03, p =
.11(two-tailed); altruism, pr = .01, p = .77(two-tailed).
Hypothesis 1b. Theistic and atheistic participants with the strongest levels of
certainty (i.e., absolute certainty in God’s existence or nonexistence) were hypothesized
to have similar levels of mental health. Partial support was found for this hypothesis.
The theistically certain participants (n = 355) were compared to the atheistically certain
participants (n = 531) while controlling for the variance accounted for by social support
satisfaction, income level, age, gender, recruitment channel, race/ethnicity, geographic
region, and education level. MANCOVA testing using Pillai’s trace revealed that there
was a significant effect of certainty type on mental health, V = .040, F (6, 861) = 6.020, p
< .001, partial η2 = .040. Given the significant result, follow up ANCOVA tests were
done for each of the six mental health variables with a Bonferroni adjustment threshold of
p = .007. Table 6 depicts the mental health means for each of the 8 certainty types.
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Table 6
Mental Health Variable Estimated Marginal Means and Standard Deviations by
Certainty Type
Grat.

L. Sat.

Hope

P. Aff.

N. Aff.

Alt.

Absolutely Certain God Exists (n = 385)

5.97
(.79)

4.61
(1.38)

3.12
(.43)

3.56
(.70)

2.44
(.88)

3.82
(.63)

Mostly Certain God Exists (n = 266)

5.91
(.77)

4.53
(1.37)

3.09
(.43)

3.44
(.75)

2.37
(.84)

3.66
(.64)

Somewhat Certain God Exists (n = 152)

5.68
(.88)

4.01
(1.32)

3.00
(.41)

3.28
(.68)

2.52
(.80)

3.69
(.68)

Existence or Nonexistence is Unknowable (n = 941)

5.71
(.99)

4.30
(1.46)

3.06
(.47)

3.38
(.78)

2.44
(.84)

3.73
(.68)

Unsure about Existence or Nonexistence (n = 478)

5.66
(.92)

4.30
(1.39)

3.03
(.45)

3.31
(.80)

2.40
(.81)

3.61
(.69)

Somewhat Certain God Does Not Exist (n = 325)

5.58
(.94)

4.27
(1.31)

2.99
(.43)

3.31
(.71)

2.47
(.81)

3.60
(.67)

Mostly Certain God Does Not Exist (n = 1,531)

5.63
(.92)

4.32
(1.37)

3.04
(.45)

3.36
(.76)

2.35
(.82)

3.63
(.67)

Absolutely Certain God Does Not Exist (n = 586)

5.59
(1.05)

4.40
(1.48)

3.14
(.49)

3.51
(.75)

2.34
(.85)

3.65
(.74)

Note. Grat. = Gratitude; L. Sat. = Life Satisfaction; P. Aff. = Positive Affect; N. Aff. =
Negative Affect; Alt. = Altruism.
ANCOVA testing showed that there was a significant effect of certainty type on
gratitude, F (1, 866) = 27.162, p < .001, partial η2 = .030, meaning that theistically certain
participants had higher levels of gratitude. The effect size difference between groups
based on the estimated marginal means was .41d, a medium sized effect favoring the
mental health of those who were absolutely certain God exists.
ANCOVA testing showed that there was not a significant effect of certainty type
on life satisfaction, F (1, 866) = 3.906, p < .048, partial η2 = .004, meaning that
theistically and atheistically certain participants had similar levels of life satisfaction.
The effect size difference between groups based on the estimated marginal means was
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.15d, a small sized effect favoring the mental health of those who were absolutely certain
God exists.
ANCOVA testing showed that there was not a significant effect of certainty type
on hope, F (1, 866) = .027, p = .869, partial η2 < .001, meaning that theistically and
atheistically certain participants had similar levels of hope. The effect size difference
between groups based on their estimated marginal means was .04d, which was not
meaningfully different from zero.
ANCOVA testing showed that there was not a significant effect of certainty type
on positive affect, F (1, 866) = 3.224, p = .073, partial η2 = .004, meaning that theistically
and atheistically certain participants had similar levels of positive affect. The effect size
difference between groups based on the estimated marginal means was .07d, which was
not meaningfully different from zero.
ANCOVA testing showed that there was not a significant effect of certainty type
on negative affect, F (1, 866) = 3.239, p = .072, partial η2 = .004, meaning that
theistically and atheistically certain participants had similar levels of negative affect. The
effect size difference between groups based on the estimated marginal means was .12d,
which was a small sized effect favoring the mental health of those who were absolutely
certain that God does not exist.
ANCOVA testing showed that there was not a significant effect of certainty type
on altruism, F (1, 866) = 6.234, p = .013, partial η2 = .007, meaning that theistically and
atheistically certain participants had similar levels of altruism. The effect size difference
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between groups based on the estimated marginal means was .25d, which was a small
sized effect favoring the mental health of those who were absolutely certain God exists.
Testing Hypothesis 1b revealed a mix of findings that supported or did not
support expectations. Theistically certain participants showed more favorable mental
health levels based on effect size calculations for gratitude, life satisfaction, and altruism,
with gratitude being the most prominent difference. Atheistically certain participants
showed more favorable mental health by having slightly lower levels of negative affect
based on its effect size calculation. The effect size calculations supported Hypothesis 1b
in regards to the negligible differences found between groups for the hope and positive
affect variables. Based on the ANCOVA tests, life satisfaction, hope, positive affect,
negative affect, and altruism were not statistically different between either group which
supported Hypothesis 1b. The statistically significant effect for higher gratitude levels
among the theistically certain did not support Hypothesis 1b. Overall, certainty type, be
it theistic or atheistic in nature, ended up accounting for very little unique variance in the
mental health variables when covariates were included in the model. In sum, due to the
multiple nonsignificant effects there was partial support for Hypothesis 1b that those who
were absolutely certain in God’s existence or nonexistence had similar levels of mental
health. Figures 8 through 13 detail all 8 levels of theistic/atheistic certainty and
approximations of their mean values for each mental health variable (excluding the
influence of the covariates).
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Figure 8. Certainty type with gratitude mean.

Figure 9. Certainty type with life satisfaction mean.
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Figure 10. Certainty type with hope mean.

Figure 11. Certainty type with positive affect mean.
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Figure 12. Certainty type with negative affect mean.

Figure 13. Certainty type with altruism mean.
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Hypothesis 1c. This hypothesis posited that dogmatism would mediate the
relationship between one’s theistic/atheistic certainty levels and mental health within a
structural equation model. A hybrid model was evaluated sequentially according to the
procedures outlined by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) and Kenny (2011). The initial
measurement model indicated fit indices values of χ2 = 3,467.75, df = 151, p < .001 with
a CFI of .858, a TLI of .821, and an RMSEA of .069 (with a 90% CI of .067-.071),
evidencing a bad fit partly due to the altruism and negative affect indicators not loading
on the mental health latent construct adequately. Altruism had a standardized loading of
.42 and negative affect had a loading of -.36, as compared to the loadings of .71, .74, .71,
and .68 for hope, life satisfaction, gratitude, and positive affect, respectively. Altruism
and negative affect were removed from the model entirely because of the relatively weak
loadings. Theoretically this made sense in that altruism may not have been a strong
indicator of one’s mental health because it focused on interpersonal behaviors that are
socially adaptive as opposed to intrapersonal factors that typify one’s individual mental
health state. Negative affect may have emerged as theoretically distinct because it was
the only construct associated with mental health that focused on negative aspects of
mental health while all other indicators were positive indicators. The removal of altruism
and negative affect was not integral to the hypothesis testing, as they were only included
with the intent to create a comprehensive and widespread mental health construct. The
remaining four variables still achieved this to a respectable degree.
The revised model resulted in an improvement in the fit indices, but the overall fit
was still only marginal. The indices were χ2 = 1,872.20, df = 116, p < .001 with a CFI of
.914, a TLI of .886, and an RMSEA of .057 (with a 90% CI of .055-.059). In order to
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improve model fit further, the second modification included a removal of the sheaf and
dummy variables along with their paths associated with the education variable. The sheaf
variable used for the educational levels was not significantly related to any variable in the
model so all dummy variables along with the sheaf variable were removed in order to
create a more parsimonious model. The path from the education sheaf variable to
theistic/atheistic certainty had a standardized regression weight of .023 and a p value of
.357. Education was only a control variable, and previous research had not consistently
established a theoretical link between education level and variables like theistic/atheistic
certainty, so its removal did not affect the theoretical underpinnings of the model. The
removal of education from the model resulted in the following indices that demonstrated
an improvement in the model and an overall acceptable model fit. The indices were χ2 =
1,053.04, df = 50, p < .001 with a CFI of .926, a TLI of .903, and an RMSEA of .066
(with a 90% CI of .062-.069).
Evaluation of unspecified paths revealed that self-presentation bias and
satisfaction with social support were significantly correlated with each other, and age had
a statistically significant relationship with the mental health construct. These
relationships were allowed to remain in the model. While further refinements could have
been made to the model to increase the fit even further, such changes would have only
been empirically justifiable and not have been theoretically justifiable so modifications
were ceased at this point. The finalized recursive over-identified model, illustrated in
Figure 14, had fit indices of χ2 = 952.71, df = 48, p < .001 with a CFI of .934, a TLI of
.909, and an RMSEA of .064 (with a 90% CI of .060-.067). Taken together, these fit
indices evidenced an acceptable model fit to the data. Table 7 lists the associated
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regression estimates of the entire model. A full mediation analysis was not conducted
because while theistic/atheistic certainty was positively predictive of mental health and
dogmatism, dogmatism was negatively related to mental health within the SEM model.
Dogmatism’s relationship with mental health was contrary to expectation outright and so
no support was found for Hypothesis 1c that dogmatism was mediating the relationship
between theistic/atheistic certainty and mental health.
Table 7
Hypothesis 1c Regression Weights
Path
Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio
p
SPB  TAC
.041
.344
.140
2.462
.014
Age  TAC
.151
.026
.003
9.082
< .001
SPB  Dog.
.036
.184
.066
2.776
.005
TAC  Dog.
.565
.346
.011
31.586
< .001
Dog.  MH
-.081
-.024
.005
-4.512
< .001
S. Sup. MH
.551
.222
.006
34.521
< .001
SPB  MH
.152
.229
.021
10.867
< .001
TAC  MH
.138
.025
.004
6.684
< .001
Age  MH
.067
.002
.000
4.790
< .001
MH  P. Aff.
.691
1.625
.040
41.020
< .001
MH  Gratitude
.705
2.087
.050
41.718
< .001
MH  L. Sat.
.754
3.273
.074
43.957
< .001
MH  Hope
.713
1.000
TAC  TACitem1
.683
1.000
TAC  TACitem2
.724
.783
.021
37.616
< .001
TAC  TACitem3
.485
.519
.019
27.702
< .001
TAC TACitem4
.669
.660
.018
35.981
< .001
Note. TAC = Theistic/Atheistic Certainty; Dog. = Dogmatism; S. Sup. = Social Support
Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. = Life Satisfaction; P. Aff. = Positive
Affect; MH = Mental Health.
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Figure 14. Hypothesis 1c final model with standardized regression weights.
Note. TAC = Theistic/Atheistic Certainty; S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB =
Self-Presentation Bias; MH = Mental Health.
The four item version of the theistic/atheistic certainty variable used in this study
is a linear representation of a curvilinear effect detailed by Galen and Kloet (2010). To
explicably test a curvilinear effect in a manner more similar to Galen and Kloet, an
additional model was created to test how one’s beliefs related to mental health. Item 1
from the theistic/atheistic certainty scale was entered into a model and was tested for a
linear and a curvilinear relationship with mental health by inputting the raw value of Item
1 (range of 3 to -3) and a squared value of Item 1 as two separate predictor variables into
a structural equation model. More specifically, the linear version of this variable
considered higher levels of theistic beliefs as the greatest values with absolute certainty in
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God’s existence equaling a value of 3, mostly certain in God’s existence equaling a value
of 2, and somewhat certain in God’s existence equaling a value of 1. Each progressive
level of atheistic beliefs were lower in value with somewhat certain in God’s
nonexistence equaling a value of -1, mostly certain in God’s existence equaling a value of
-2, and absolute certainty in God’s nonexistence being the lowest possible value of -3.
Agnostic beliefs were given a value of 0 for both forms of the variable so that this belief
type could serve as a midpoint and as the lowest point for the linear form and curvilinear
form of the variable, respectively. The curvilinear form of this variable squared each of
the linear values which consequently equated theistic beliefs and atheistic beliefs to
similar values based on their certainty level (e.g., being absolutely certain in God’s
existence or nonexistence would both result in a value of 9 for the curvilinear variable
version). These two variables were input into the model depicted below in Figure 15.
The fit statistics for this model were χ2 = 849.989, df = 26, p < .001 with a CFI of .901, a
TLI of .864, and an RMSEA of .082 (with a 90% CI of .078-.087), which collectively
indicated a marginal model fit. Model adjustments were not made because the intent was
only to compare the linear and curvilinear forms of participant belief strength. As Table
8 indicates, both the linear variable and the curvilinear variable form were statistically
significant predictors of mental health levels and both of these effects were small in
regards to their strength. The linear depiction of belief strength that valued theism higher
had a standardized regression weight of .09, and the curvilinear depiction that valued
either type of certainty level higher had a standardized regression weight of .10.
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Figure 15. Linear and curvilinear comparison with standardized regression weights.
Note. TAC1_linear = Theistic/Atheistic Certainty item 1 linear version;
TAC1_curvilinear = Theistic/Atheistic Certainty item 1 curvilinear version; S. Supp. =
Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; MH = Mental Health.
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Table 8
Linear and Curvilinear Comparison Regression Weights
Path
Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio
Linear  MH
.090
.017
.003
6.553
Curvilinear  MH
.097
.010
.001
7.062
S. Sup. MH
.548
.219
.006
34.234
SPB  MH
.149
.223
.021
10.690
Age  MH
.058
.002
.000
4.214
MH  P. Aff.
.687
1.625
.040
40.568
MH  Gratitude
.707
2.105
.051
41.538
MH  L. Sat.
.754
3.290
.075
43.621
MH  Hope
.709
1.000
Note. Linear = Linear form of Theistic/Atheistic Certainty item 1; Curvilinear =

p
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
-

Curvilinear from of Theistic/Atheistic Certainty item 1; S. Sup. = Social Support
Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. = Life Satisfaction; P. Aff. = Positive
Affect; MH = Mental Health.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b. It was posited that religious/spiritual coping styles would
be significantly predictive of mental health for both participants who identify as religious
(Hypothesis 2a) as well as participants who identify as secular (Hypothesis 2b) while
controlling for influences of gender, race/ethnicity, age, income level, geographic
location, social support, and self-presentation bias. Specifically, religious participants
included Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Muslims, and Jewish participants (n = 752) while
secular participants included agnostics, atheists, and the spiritual but nonreligious
participants (n = 3,153).
The same latent construct for mental health from the final model for Hypothesis
1c was used for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. For the current model, the covariates associated
with race/ethnicity status caused the measurement model solutions to be inadmissible
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when calculated. The tests that followed found that the covariates of gender, recruitment
channel, geographic location, age/coping interaction, income/coping interaction, had
weak standardized regression weights (.08, .08, .03, .05, and .02, respectively) and caused
poor model fit. Each of these variables were sequentially removed. The theoretically
pertinent variables (i.e., religious/spiritual coping and its indicators as well as mental
health and its indicators) along with the covariates of self-presentation bias, social
support satisfaction, age, and income level remained after analyzing both the
measurement and structural models. The resultant over-identified recursive model for
both groups combined was χ2 = 910.21, df =47, p < .001 with model fit statistics of CFI
of .938, a TLI of .913, and an RMSEA of .069 (with a 90% CI of .065-.072). Considered
in conjunction, these fit indices suggested that the model was an acceptable fit to the data.
Table 9 conveys the values of the estimates from the combined group final model while
Figure 16 illustrates the final model used for both groups.
Table 9
Hypothesis 2a/2b Regression Weights for a Combined Religious and Secular Group
Path
RSC  MH
Age  RSC
S.Supp.  MH
SPB  MH
Inc.  MH
RSC  RSCitem1
RSC  RSCitem2
RSC  RSCitem3
RSC  RSCitem4
MH  Hope
MH  Gratitude
MH  L. Sat.
MH  P. Aff.

Standardized
.169
.146
.537
.161
.175
.865
.824
.578
.707
.720
.709
.756
.691

Unstandardized
.061
.013
.217
.246
.032
1.000
.921
.641
.829
1.000
2.073
3.267
1.619
79

Error
.006
.001
.007
.023
.003
.017
.018
.018
.053
.080
.042

Critical Ratio
10.687
8.562
31.822
10.891
11.801
54.310
36.576
46.592
39.003
41.070
38.168

p
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

Note. S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. =
Life Satisfaction; P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; RSC =
Religious/Spiritual Coping; Inc. = Income.

Figure 16. Hypotheses 2a/2b final combined group model with standardized regression
weights.
Note. S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; MH =
Mental Health; RSC = Religious/Spiritual Coping.
The standardized regression coefficient for the religious/spiritual coping construct
onto the mental health construct was .26 for the religious participants and .14 for the
secular group. This indicated that religious/spiritual coping was positively predictive for
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both religious and secular participants and these relationships would be considered
between small to medium sized effects (based on Kline’s [1998] effect size metric where
.1 to .2 is small, .3 to .4 is medium, and .5 or greater is considered large). For the
multiple group analysis, the unconstrained model’s values were χ2 = 890.69 (df = 94) and
the fully constrained model’s values were χ2 = 973.86 (df = 105), leaving the chi-square
difference test result at 83.17 (df = 11), p < .001, meaning that the models were not
invariant. In other words, the models as a whole were significantly different between
religious and secular participants. Follow up chi-square analyses for the model with the
path from the religious/spiritual coping construct to the mental health construct
constrained did not achieve statistical significance. This model achieved a value of χ2 =
891.52 (df = 95) which was below even the 90% confidence interval chi-square value of
893.39 (df = 95) meaning that the two groups were not statistically different in regards to
the effect of religious/spiritual coping onto mental health. In light of these results, both
Hypotheses 2a and 2b were supported in that religious/spiritual coping was a positive and
significant predictor for both religious and secular participants, and religious/spiritual
coping’s predictive strength was not significantly different between religious and secular
participant groups. Tables 10 and 11 detail the regression weights for the religious group
and the secular group, respectively.
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Table 10
Hypothesis 2a/2b Regression Weights for Religious Group
Path
Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio
p
RSC  MH
.258
.080
.012
6.612
< .001
Age  RSC
.270
.019
.003
6.889
< .001
S.Supp.  MH
.538
.185
..014
13.024
< .001
SPB  MH
.149
.190
.044
4.359
< .001
Inc.  MH
.107
.017
.005
3.197
= .001
RSC  RSCitem1
.812
1.000
RSC  RSCitem2
.820
.923
.047
19.496
< .001
RSC  RSCitem3
.534
.628
.046
13.797
< .001
RSC  RSCitem4
.557
.706
.049
14.406
< .001
MH  Hope
.644
1.000
MH  Gratitude
.725
2.373
.152
15.659
< .001
MH  L. Sat.
.725
3.637
.232
15.658
< .001
MH  P. Aff.
.710
1.852
.120
15.447
< .001
Note. S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. =
Life Satisfaction; P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; RSC =
Religious/Spiritual Coping; Inc. = Income.
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Table 11
Hypothesis 2a/2b Regression Weights for Secular Group
Path
Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio
p
RSC  MH
.135
.066
.009
7.550
< .001
Age  RSC
.035
.002
.001
1.772
.076
S.Supp.  MH
.535
.225
.008
28.888
< .001
SPB  MH
.164
.260
.026
9.964
< .001
Inc.  MH
.190
.035
.003
11.490
< .001
RSC  RSCitem1
.816
1.000
RSC  RSCitem2
.746
.950
.024
39.151
< .001
RSC  RSCitem3
.565
.787
.026
29.834
< .001
RSC  RSCitem4
.739
1.056
.027
38.856
< .001
MH  Hope
.737
1.000
MH  Gratitude
.702
1.984
.056
35.489
< .001
MH  L. Sat.
.761
3.181
.084
38.005
< .001
MH  P. Aff.
.688
1.573
.045
34.838
< .001
Note. S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. =
Life Satisfaction; P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; RSC =
Religious/Spiritual Coping; Inc. = Income.
In consideration that the absence of statistically significant differences for the
religious/spiritual coping effects between the secular and religious participants may have
been due to the secular group including the spiritual nonreligious participants, an
additional multiple group analysis was conducted that removed the spiritual nonreligious
participants from the secular group and compared the remaining members (i.e., the
atheists and agnostics) to the religious group. For this multiple group analysis, the
unconstrained model’s values were χ2 = 820.15 (df = 94) and the fully constrained
model’s values were χ2 = 924.66 (df = 105), leaving the chi-square difference test result
at 104.51 (df = 11), p < .001, meaning that the models were not invariant. In other
words, the models as a whole were significantly different between the religious group and
the atheist/agnostic group. Follow up chi-square analyses for the model with the path
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from the religious/spiritual coping construct to the mental health construct constrained
achieved a value of χ2 = 823.37 (df = 95) which was statistically significant at the 90%
confidence interval threshold of χ2 = 822.86 (df = 95). The standardized regression
coefficient between religious/spiritual coping and mental health for the atheist/agnostic
group was .08, compared to .26 for the religious group. These results collectively
indicated that atheists and agnostics in particular did not demonstrate as strong as a
relationship between religious/spiritual coping and mental health as religious participants
did. Table 12 depicts the regression weights for the atheist/agnostic group.
Table 12
Hypothesis 2a/2b Regression Weights for the Atheist and Agnostic Group
Path
Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio
p
RSC  MH
.078
.048
.012
3.900
< .001
Age  RSC
-.044
-.003
.001
-1.987
.047
S.Supp.  MH
.540
.225
.008
26.460
< .001
SPB  MH
.167
.261
.028
9.266
< .001
Inc.  MH
.188
.035
.003
10.383
< .001
RSC  RSCitem1
.758
1.000
RSC  RSCitem2
.698
1.033
.036
28.776
< .001
RSC  RSCitem3
.511
.851
.038
22.516
< .001
RSC  RSCitem4
.687
1.074
.038
28.557
< .001
MH  Hope
.731
1.000
MH  Gratitude
.696
1.995
.062
31.972
< .001
MH  L. Sat.
.758
3.205
.093
34.279
< .001
MH  P. Aff.
.679
1.562
.050
31.277
< .001
Note. S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. =
Life Satisfaction; P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; RSC =
Religious/Spiritual Coping; Inc. = Income.
Hypotheses 3a and 3b. These hypotheses posited that spiritual harmony would
positively predict mental health levels among the religious participants (Hypothesis 3a)
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and the secular participants (Hypothesis 3b) after controlling for social support and selfpresentation bias. The same classifications of religious and secular groups from the
initial Hypotheses 2a/2b analyses were used for this model.
Using the same latent construct structure for mental health as the previous
models, the measurement model with both groups included was initially tested and
indicated a mixture of acceptable and bad fit indices. The values were χ2 = 868.056, df =
33, p < .001 with model fit statistics of CFI of .926, a TLI of .877, and an RMSEA of
.080 (with a 90% CI of .076-.085). Further inspection indicated that the self-presentation
bias variable had a weakly related regression weight of .09 onto the mental health
construct and was removed because it was not originally included for theoretical reasons
but only as a precaution for possible strong covariation effects. This change resulted in
the following over-identified recursive model of χ2 = 632.889, df = 25, p < .001 with
model fit statistics of CFI of .945, a TLI of .901, and an RMSEA of .079 (with a 90% CI
of .074-.084). Overall, these fit indices suggested that the model was an acceptable fit to
the data. Table 13 conveys the values of the estimates from the combined group final
model while Figure 17 illustrates that final model used for both groups.
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Table 13
Hypotheses 3a/3b Regression Weights for a Combined Religious and Secular Group
Path
Standardized Unstandardized Error Critical Ratio
p
SH  MH
.526
.054
.002
23.966
< .001
S.Supp.  MH
.335
.136
.007
19.375
< .001
SH  Pers.
.846
1.000
SH  Comm.
.685
.613
.016
37.487
< .001
SH  Env.
.531
.424
.014
30.052
< .001
SH  Tran.
.210
.210
.018
11.916
< .001
MH  Hope
.720
1.000
MH  Gratitude
.695
2.032
.052
38.837
< .001
MH  L. Sat.
.760
3.285
.078
41.940
< .001
MH  P. Aff.
.708
1.658
.042
39.520
< .001
Note. S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. =
Life Satisfaction; P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual
Harmony; Pers. = Personal Spiritual Harmony; Comm. = Communal Spiritual Harmony;
Env. = Environmental Spiritual Harmony; Tran. = Transcendent Spiritual Harmony.
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Figure 17. Hypotheses 3a/3b final combined group model with standardized regression
weights.
Note. S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual
Harmony.
The standardized regression coefficient for the spiritual harmony construct onto
the mental health construct was .59 for the religious participants and .52 for the secular
group. This indicated that spiritual harmony had a large effect on mental health for both
religious and secular participants. For the multiple group analysis, the unconstrained
model’s values were χ2 = 636.737 (df = 50) and the fully constrained model’s values were
χ2 = 743.917 (df = 58), leaving the chi-square difference test result at 107.18 (df = 8), p <
.001, meaning that the models were not invariant. Restated, the models as a whole were
significantly different between religious and secular participants. Follow up chi-square
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analyses for the model with the path from the spiritual harmony construct to the mental
health construct constrained did not achieve statistical significance. This model achieved
a value of χ2 = 638.476 (df = 51) which was below even the 90% confidence interval chisquare value of 639.44 (df = 51). Given these results, both Hypotheses 3a and 3b were
supported in that spiritual harmony was a significant predictor for both religious and
secular participants, and the slightly stronger predictive strength for religious participants
was not significantly different from the predictive strength for secular participants.
Tables 14 and 15 list the regression weights specifically for the religious and secular
group models, respectively.
Table 14
Hypotheses 3a/3b Regression Weights for the Religious Group
Path
Standardized Unstandardized
Error Critical Ratio
p
SH  MH
.590
.049
.004
11.538
< .001
S.Supp.  MH
.296
.104
.014
7.565
< .001
SH  Pers.
.864
1.000
SH  Comm.
.684
.601
.033
18.406
< .001
SH  Env.
.580
.482
.031
15.459
< .001
SH  Tran.
.491
.547
.042
12.941
< .001
MH  Hope
.653
1.000
MH  Gratitude
.712
2.302
.144
16.040
< .001
MH  L. Sat.
.731
3.626
.222
16.367
< .001
MH  P. Aff.
.737
1.897
.115
16.453
< .001
Note. S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. =
Life Satisfaction; P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual
Harmony; Pers. = Personal Spiritual Harmony; Comm. = Communal Spiritual Harmony;
Env. = Environmental Spiritual Harmony; Tran. = Transcendent Spiritual Harmony.
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Table 15
Hypotheses 3a/3b Regression Weights for the Secular Group
Path
Standardized Unstandardized
Error Critical Ratio
p
SH  MH
.520
.056
.003
21.252 < .001
S.Supp.  MH
.338
.141
.008
17.570 < .001
SH  Pers.
.841
1.000
SH  Comm.
.685
.617
.019
32.843 < .001
SH  Env.
.519
.410
.016
26.010 < .001
SH  Tran.
.133
.123
.018
6.724 < .001
MH  Hope
.733
1.000
MH  Gratitude
.689
1.959
.056
35.155 < .001
MH  L. Sat.
.764
3.210
.083
38.497 < .001
MH  P. Aff.
.701
1.612
.045
35.715 < .001
Note. S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. =
Life Satisfaction; P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual
Harmony; Pers. = Personal Spiritual Harmony; Comm. = Communal Spiritual Harmony;
Env. = Environmental Spiritual Harmony; Tran. = Transcendent Spiritual Harmony.
In consideration that the absence of statistically significant differences for the
spiritual harmony effects between the secular and religious participants may have been
due to the secular group including the spiritual nonreligious participants, an additional
multiple group analysis was conducted that removed the spiritual nonreligious
participants from the secular group and compared the remaining members (i.e., the
atheists and agnostics) to the religious group. For this multiple group analysis, the
unconstrained model’s values were χ2 = 539.938 (df = 50) and the fully constrained
model’s values were χ2 = 654.12 (df = 105), leaving the chi-square difference test result
at 114.182 (df = 8), p < .001, meaning that the models were not invariant. In other
words, the models as a whole were significantly different between the religious group and
the atheist/agnostic group. Follow up chi-square analyses for the model with the path
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from the spiritual harmony construct to the mental health construct constrained achieved
a value of χ2 = 541.267 (df = 51) which did not achieve statistical significance as it was
below the 90% confidence interval threshold of χ2 = 542.64 (df = 51). The standardized
regression coefficient between spiritual harmony and mental health for the
atheist/agnostic group was .51, compared to .59 for the religious group. These results
collectively indicated that atheists and agnostics in particular demonstrated a similar
relationship between spiritual harmony and mental health just as the religious participants
did. Table 16 depicts the regression weights for the atheist/agnostic group.
Table 16
Hypotheses 3a/3b Regression Weights for the Atheist and Agnostic Group
Path
Standardized
Unstandardized
Error Critical Ratio
p
SH  MH
.508
.053
.002
22.223
< .001
S.Supp.  MH
.348
.142
.009
16.689
< .001
SH  Pers.
.842
1.000
SH  Comm.
.672
.597
.020
29.595
< .001
SH  Env.
.506
.393
.017
23.247
< .001
SH  Tran.
.107
.097
.020
4.952
< .001
MH  Hope
.721
1.000
MH  Gratitude
.685
1.994
.063
31.819
< .001
MH  L. Sat.
.762
3.277
.094
34.949
< .001
MH  P. Aff.
.690
1.612
.050
32.035
< .001
Note. S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; SPB = Self-Presentation Bias; L. Sat. =
Life Satisfaction; P. Aff. = Positive Affect; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual
Harmony; Pers. = Personal Spiritual Harmony; Comm. = Communal Spiritual Harmony;
Env. = Environmental Spiritual Harmony; Tran. = Transcendent Spiritual Harmony.
Exploratory research question. Similar to the evaluative steps of the previous
hypotheses for the SEM models, the exploratory research question model was evaluated
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sequentially. Significant paths were retained from the measurement model and although
the fit was not ideal, changes to the model were not made in order to keep all
theoretically pertinent variables so that the research question could be addressed as
intended (e.g., dogmatism was included in the model even though it was not significantly
related or weakly predictive for several variables). The satisfaction with social support
variable was also included since this construct had evidenced in previous models that it
was consistently and strongly covariant with mental health. The final trimmed model is
illustrated in Figure 18 with the regression weights displayed in Table 17. The results for
this over-identified recursive model were χ2 = 2,405.581, df = 124, p < .001 with model
fit statistics of CFI of .916, a TLI of .884, and an RMSEA of .063 (with a 90% CI of
.061-.065). Consideration of the fit indices suggested that the model was only a marginal
fit to the data. This model was considered appropriate to at the very least explore the
predictive strengths of each of the variables in a multivariate context.
Based on Kline’s (1998) effect size metric, only the standardized regression
coefficient of spiritual harmony had a large effect on mental health. The only medium
sized effect was for the covariate of social support satisfaction. All other effects from
theistic/atheistic certainty, religious/spiritual coping, and dogmatism would be considered
small in size. Dogmatism was the only variable negatively predictive of mental health.
This information suggested that spiritual harmony shared the strongest relationship with
mental health when compared to any other variable used in this study.
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Figure 18. Exploratory research question final model with standardized regression
weights.
Note. S. Supp. = Social Support Satisfaction; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual
Harmony; RSC = Religious/Spiritual coping; TAC = Theistic/Atheistic Certainty.
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Table 17
Exploratory Question Regression Weights
Path
Standardized
Unstandardized
Error Critical Ratio
p
SH  MH
.508
.051
.002
25.197
<.001
S.Supp.  MH
.326
.131
.006
20.685
<.001
Dog.  MH.
-.145
-.043
.005
-8.662
<.001
TAC  MH.
.100
.018
.003
5.289
< .001
RSC  MH.
.151
.055
.005
10.689
< .001
Note. Indicators for latent constructs were excluded for brevity. S. Supp. = Social
Support Satisfaction; MH = Mental Health; SH = Spiritual Harmony; TAC =
Theistic/Atheistic Certainty; RSC = Religious/Spiritual Coping; Dog. = Dogmatism.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
A diverse sample of religious and secular ideological adherents were recruited via
various internet communication channels and completed questionnaire data regarding
their beliefs, coping patterns, spirituality, and mental health. Specifically, one’s
existential belief strength, general dogmatic thinking style, religious/spiritual coping
behaviors, and spiritual harmony were measured then investigated both separately and
conjunctively in order to determine how each of these variables related to one’s mental
health levels. The mental health variable included a composite of several variables
comprised of the following measured constructs: hope, positive affect, negative affect,
gratitude, life satisfaction, and altruism. The groups used in the study included sizable
representations of atheist, agnostic, Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, and spiritual
nonreligious respondents. In particular, secular participants (agnostics, atheists, and the
spiritual but nonreligious), a historically understudied but often speculated about group,
made up the greatest portion of the 4,667 total sample. This study not only contributed to
the field due to its diverse and large sample, but also because it used multiple definitions
of mental health and examined construct relationships through advanced statistical
techniques, such as structural equation modeling. Further, the measures of these
constructs used in this study all evidenced acceptable psychometric properties and were
more multiculturally applicable than previous studies because they were more consistent
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with the ideologies of secular groups. The current study explored how one’s certainty in
God’s existence or nonexistence would relate to one’s mental health and general
dogmatic thinking style. This study also explored whether religious and secular
participants experienced similar or differing effects in regard to how religious/spiritual
coping and spiritually harmonious lifestyles associated with their mental health levels.
Theistic/Atheistic Certainty and Dogmatism
Background. Works such as Koenig et al. (2001) illustrated that numerous
studies have found that as one’s religiousness increases so does one’s mental health.
These relationships are moderated somewhat depending on the definitions of
religiousness and mental health that are used, but overall the previous research has
suggested a linear relationship between religiousness and mental health (i.e., as one
increases, the other tends to also increase but not necessarily by an equal amount). As
such, social groups, such as secular persons, who by definition exhibit little to no
religious characteristics would be expected to be less mentally healthy, just as previous
works have argued (Schumaker, 1992). In contrast, a smaller group of studies like Galen
and Kloet (2010) have explored whether a curvilinear effect was more descriptive of the
phenomena that affect one’s mental health. In the context of studies similar to Galen and
Kloet, the curvilinear effect refers to the idea that as one’s belief strength increases their
mental health will also increase. This effect could be considered curvilinear because it
entails that one’s belief may gravitate towards a religious pole or a secular pole, but no
matter the orientation of the belief as long as it is strong it would likely associate with
more favorable mental health levels. In other words, data from studies like Galen and
Kloet have produced evidence that whether the beliefs of a person are religious or secular
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in nature is not the vital mechanism that affects one’s mental health, but it is the strength
of those beliefs that are the crucial component regarding the relationship with one’s
mental health. Moreover, one who has strong religious beliefs and one who has strong
secular beliefs would be expected to have similar levels of mental health and would both
be healthier than religious or secular persons with weaker beliefs. The current study
tested whether a linear relationship (i.e., as religious belief increases so does mental
health) or a curvilinear relationship (i.e., as belief strength increases so does mental
health) was more descriptive by having both religious and secular participants indicate
their certainty levels in God’s existence. The theistic/atheistic certainty construct in the
current study measured the strength of one’s certainty regardless of whether it was
theistically or atheistically based (strength levels were differentiated from each other by
participants describing themselves as absolutely certain, mostly certain, and somewhat
certain in God’s existence/nonexistence). Participants with agnostic belief characteristics
were measured as the least certain in regards to the theistic/atheistic certainty construct.
One speculation that the current study explored was whether theistic/atheistic
certainty may be acting as an indicator or proxy variable for one’s general dogmatism
level. Dogmatism was defined in the current study as possessing an unjustified certainty
and conviction that is resilient against opposing beliefs. The salient difference between
the dogmatism construct and theistic/atheistic certainty construct was that dogmatism was
an indicator of one’s general thinking style while theistic/atheistic certainty was
specifically focused on one’s beliefs about God’s existence. If theistic/atheistic certainty
was merely acting as proxy, then one would expect that dogmatism would be related to
one’s mental health and might be an equally if not more effective predictor of the
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relationship between beliefs and mental health. In light of this possibility, participants
also completed a measure that quantified their dogmatism levels.
Findings, Interpretations, and Future Research. Hypothesis 1a posited that
theistic/atheistic certainty levels would positively predict one’s mental health. The data
revealed that participants’ theistic/atheistic certainty levels showed weak but some
statistically significant positive relationships with three of the six mental health variables.
Although these effects were statistically apparent, they were not substantial enough to
equate to a practically noticeable difference. One’s certainty in God’s existence or
nonexistence explained less than 1% of the variability in one’s life satisfaction, less than
1% of the variability in hope, and about 1.4% of the variability in positive affect. The
magnitude of effects of belief certainty for the current study were similar to Galen and
Kloet’s (2010) results which demonstrated that belief certainty explained 2% and 1% of
the variability in participants’ life satisfaction and emotional stability, respectively.
Theistic/Atheistic certainty levels for the current study did not evidence veritable effects
on the other mental health variables of gratitude, negative affect, or altruism.
Hypothesis 1b posited that the participants with the strongest level of theistic
certainty and those with the strongest level of atheistic certainty would have similar
levels of mental health and partial support was found for this hypothesis. Echoing the
findings of Galen and Kloet (2010), the current study found that more theistically and
atheistically certain participants (i.e., those who were absolutely certain in God’s
existence/nonexistence) tended to have better levels of mental health than all of their
counterparts who each were less certain about their beliefs. The curvilinear relationship
(coined by Galen and Kloet) was partially accurate at describing the relationship between
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beliefs and mental health for the current study. The current study suggested that while
stronger certainty levels tended to equate to higher mental health levels, being devoid of
certainty (i.e., having an agnostic belief type) was not as unhealthy as one would expect.
In fact, participants who identified as agnostic because they believe God’s existence or
nonexistence was unknowable frequently showed more favorable mental health values
than participants who were somewhat certain about God’s existence or somewhat certain
about God’s nonexistence. Theoretically, perhaps a person who has determined that
God’s existence is unknowable is no longer in a state of identity moratorium (i.e., trying
to establish and discover a fitting personal identity). The determination that the existence
of God was unknowable may be also be characteristic of an established identity and this
is one possible explanation of the better mental health (than what was theoretically
expected) for this group. In consideration that identity moratorium states tend to
associate with higher levels of anxiety, it is plausible that people who marked that they
were unsure or only somewhat certain about their belief type were potentially
experiencing identity moratorium and would thus be experiencing an apparent decrease
in their mental health. Future studies could investigate whether identity moratorium
states are observed among people with these belief patterns in particular because egoidentity states were not measured in the current study.
In regard to the second agnostic belief type participant group, those who were
agnostic because they were unsure about whether God exists or not, they showed more
varied mental health levels in relation to the participants in both the somewhat certain in
God’s existence or somewhat certain in God’s nonexistence groups. Nonetheless, when
both of these somewhat certain groups and both of the agnostic belief type groups were
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considered together, the results supported the work of Krause and colleagues (e.g.,
Krause, 2006) because the findings indicated that higher levels of existential doubts
related to lower levels of mental health. Another avenue for future research is to not limit
investigation to only using belief certainty as an indicator of belief strength. It may be
more illuminating to study effects on mental health by examining constructs like one’s
ideological identity salience, or activism (e.g., Smith & Cimino, 2012) because while one
might possess strong or weak levels of certainty this does not necessarily mean that their
beliefs play a salient role in their life, which may be a pivotal distinction. Whitley (2010)
suggested that atheists can be more emphatic with their lack of belief and have differing
salience and commitment levels regarding their secular identity. Taking this into
account, future research should consider studying atheist cultural subgroups (e.g., antitheists) in order to clarify the potential relationships of identity salience and activism with
mental health.
Overall, the theistic/atheistic certainty investigation results suggested that the
previous literature’s descriptions of religiousness’ or belief type’s relationship with
mental health were too confined in their depiction. The linear relationship of
religiousness with mental health failed to account for the mental health benefits
associated with being atheistically certain, and the curvilinear relationship descriptor did
not account for agnostically believing participants to regularly display better mental
health than the participants who possessed slightly higher levels of certainty, be it theistic
or atheistic in nature, as evidenced by the mental health variable means for each specific
group. One finding that should be highlighted specifically is that the participants who
were absolutely certain in God’s existence demonstrated higher levels of gratitude than
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the participants who were absolutely certain in God’s nonexistence. This finding
supported the linear relationship hypothesis more than the curvilinear relationship
hypothesis, but this finding did not manifest for all mental health variables and so it only
provided limited support to a linear depiction. The variability in gratitude levels was
higher for the theistically absolutely certain participants than their atheistically absolutely
certain counterparts by a margin of 3% after accounting for contributions from other
variables (e.g., social support satisfaction). One possible explanation is that gratitude
may have been the only prominent mental health difference between religious and secular
groups because the religious group was predominately Christian, and Christians in
particular are instilled with the idea of being grateful especially in consideration of the
grace demonstrated by Jesus Christ’s sacrifice allowing for their redemption. Otherwise,
the absolutely certain theist and atheist participants had similar levels of mental health
overall. In sum, when it came to general mental health differences between each of the
atheist, theist, and agnostic belief type groups, both curvilinear and linear relationship
depictions were limited in their ability to predict mental health levels. A more apt
descriptive term based on the current results might be that belief type and certainty levels
shared a multi-curvilinear relationship with one’s mental health. At the very least, the
current study demonstrated that existential belief types and certainty shared a complex
relationship with mental health.
Hypothesis 1c posited that dogmatism would mediate the positive predictive
relationship between theistic/atheistic certainty and mental health. No support was found
for this hypothesis. As expected, dogmatism was strongly related to one’s
theistic/atheistic certainty levels. Contrary to expectations, dogmatism was not positively
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predictive of mental health when a composite mental health variable was created that
included all six of the mental health variables in the study. The lack of a positive
relationship between dogmatism and mental health was contrary to the results of the
Rokeach (1960) and the Richek et al. (1970) studies that found greater dogmatism was
related to less psychopathology. With the current study’s results in mind, dogmatism was
not found to be the explanatory and mediating variable for the positive relationship
between theistic/atheistic certainty and mental health. Dogmatism possessed a mixture of
relationships with the mental health variables when looked at individually. Dogmatism
associated with greater mental health when considering it was positively predictive of life
satisfaction and negatively predictive of negative affect, but dogmatism was negatively
related to mental health when considering its negatively predictive relationship with
gratitude and altruism. It possessed no significant relationships with positive affect or
hope. No matter the direction of the relationship, whenever an effect was evident for
dogmatism on any of these mental health variables it was weak in magnitude.
In respect to the negative relationship between dogmatism and a composite
variable of mental health, along with theistic/atheistic certainty’s positive relationship
with mental health, a complex picture emerges regarding the emotional regulation
theoretical perspective. Emotion regulation theory (Gross, 2006) explains that as one
interacts with stimuli in their environment emotional experiences result and the person
will consequently act in ways to experience a preferred emotional state (e.g., a person
who had a stressful day at work takes the initiative to relax when they get home). It was
originally expected that theistic/atheistic certainty and dogmatism would both associate
with greater levels of mental health because each would play a role in preserving more
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preferred or positive emotional states. Dogmatism’s negative impact and
theistic/atheistic certainty’s positive impact on mental health were both weak effects and
may not play a meaningful role with one’s mental health. Dogmatism, based on its
definitional component of a resiliency against opposing beliefs, was expected to prevent
distress because it would prevent instances of cognitive dissonance which can lead to
distress. This expectation was merited given previous works like Burris et al. (1997) that
demonstrated that cognitive dissonance (i.e., the discomfort resulting from the
simultaneous experience of two contradictory pieces of information) and negative affect
can both be reduced when one appeals to their religious beliefs. Perhaps the absence of
this relationship in the current study was more indicative of the temporary nature of the
distress that cognitive dissonance creates. The Burris et al. study experimentally
observed brief effects of dissonance, whereas the current study was trying to capture the
beneficial buffer that dogmatism possessed against dissonance and the subsequent
distress from a more stable, personality-based standpoint. Perhaps future research could
verify whether dogmatism acts as a buffer in short-term experimental settings to distress
only.
With the small effects of dogmatism on mental health being negatively predictive
for the current study, it was possible that specific components of the dogmatism construct
may have contributed to that relationship. Altemeyer (1996) found that dogmatism was
strongly related to right wing authoritarianism, which definitionally includes a distaste for
those who possess opposing beliefs. This weak but negative relationship between
dogmatism and mental health may be due to dogmatic persons being more likely to be
distressed by contact with people or communications that express ideological differences;
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however, even this explanation cannot account for the complex relationship patterns that
emerged between dogmatism and each of the six mental health variables. Follow up
testing will be necessary to more clearly understand the relationship of dogmatism with
mental health.
Unlike dogmatism, theistic/atheistic certainty levels and their relationship with
mental health was consistent with the emotional regulation framework as hypothesized.
From an emotional regulation theoretical perspective, it was anticipated that higher
certainty levels would indicate one’s resilience against instances of cognitive dissonance
that occur in everyday life, similar to dogmatism, and subsequently act as a buffer against
distress from the environment’s presentation of stimuli that might contradict one’s
existential worldview. Moreover, a person with such strong resiliency would experience
negatively impactful emotions less and their mental health state would be more favorable
in the long term. The current study’s findings were partially congruent with this
theoretical perspective; however, the magnitude was not as strong as expected and a
statistically veritable relationship did not exist for each of the mental health variables
individually. Such a small and inconsistent effect suggested that theistic/atheistic
certainty levels may not be the crucial ingredient that associates with greater mental
health. What was notable based on the current study’s results was that theistic/atheistic
certainty, despite being strongly related to dogmatism, affected mental health levels in an
opposite fashion than dogmatism. This demonstrated that while having resilient beliefs
in general (i.e., being dogmatic) was not necessarily beneficial to one’s mental health,
having resilient beliefs specifically pertaining to existential matters (i.e., being
theistically/atheistically certain) was mildly important in light of the limited strength of
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the association between theistic/atheistic certainty and mental health. Possibly, the
differential effect between dogmatism and theistic/atheistic certainty was that that
theistic/atheistic certainty in particular helps one come to terms with mortality.
Theistically certain participants are more likely to believe that they will join their deity
when they perish, while atheistically certain participants have been compelled to come to
terms with the idea that they have one life to live and their only option is to make the
most of it. The only limitation of this perspective is that is does not account for why
those participants that believed God’s existence or nonexistence was unknowable tended
to have slightly greater mental health levels than the theists and atheists who were only
somewhat certain about God’s existence or nonexistence. Perhaps this difference was
due to the reasons posited earlier, in that participants who have decided God’s existence
or nonexistence is unknowable have resolved their identity moratorium and are no longer
experiencing heightened levels of anxious searching for a belief that fits them.
Limitations and Additional Implications. A few limitations were inherent with
the measurement of theistic/atheistic certainty. A small group of secular participants
provided the same feedback that they disliked that the theistic/atheistic certainty measure
sometimes used the word “belief.” These participants noted that the tenets of atheism can
only be considered a belief in a colloquial sense, and that to say something does not exist,
such as God, does not qualify as a specific belief on its own. Referring to atheistic tenets
as a belief suggested that atheists have their own kind of “faith” tantamount with theistic
faith, which these secular participants felt was not considerate of the atheistic perspective
that God is a construct that was never logically created via evidential proof and that it is
incoherent to have a belief in a construct that was irrationally conceived and has never
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existed. Additionally, secular participants as well as non-monotheistic religious
participants commented that the use of the term God was problematic for them
specifically because God was not clearly defined and the implied Judeo-Christian
conception of God was not applicable to all participants. Use of terms that were
inclusive of polytheistic, deistic, and pantheistic perspectives would have been more
appropriate. Future research devoted to scale development could help create more
refined measures that encompass the diversity of ideologies between participants to more
accurately account for how certainty type relates to other constructs.
As posited by Ross (1990), determining the strength of beliefs is important when
investigating a relationship with mental health and limiting descriptions to only the
ideological label of a sample obscures the interpretability of research. The emergent
implication of the results of the current study was that researchers need to consider the
heterogeneity of religious and secular groups, and that blanket statements tend to simplify
complex relationships that can occur between mental health and the array of possible
ideological affiliations of which participants might identify. For example, Hall et al.
(2008) made the declaration that secularity is a health liability and that differentiating
between religious and secular identities could potentially help aid medical decision
making. Schumaker (1992) preceded Hall et al. by declaring that being nonreligious was
bad for one’s health. Based on the current study, the Hall et al. and Schumaker assertions
were potentially incorrect and at the very least they were large overstatements based on
the current findings. More studies should consider Hwang et al.’s (2009) argument that
combining secular groups with low religiousness groups is problematic for interpretative
considerations and that studies that did, such as Pollner (1989), potentially made
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erroneous conclusions. A maxim of multiculturally considerate research is that withingroup variability of traits (e.g., mental health) concurrently exist alongside between group
variability (see Costigan, Bardina, Cauce, & Kim, 2006; Sevig, Highlen, & Adams, 2000)
and researchers should account for such variability within the hierarchical group labels
when interpreting data. With the current study showing that the agnostics (specifically,
those who indicated they were agnostic because they were unsure) and the weakly
affirming atheistic and theistic participants tended to have the lowest mental health
levels, using one’s religious or secular identity status to partly contribute to making
medical decisions, as Hall et al. suggested, would be unwise. However, members of the
helping professions should be vigilant for people whose ideologies are more affected by
doubt due to the potential mental health disparity they experience when compared to
other ideological perspectives. Culturally informed treatments, such as multiculturally
informed psychotherapy and spiritually integrated psychotherapy (e.g., Aten & Leach,
2009) could be infused with helping services to meet the mental health needs of these
populations.
Religious/Spiritual Coping
Background. Religious/spiritual coping strategies have been studied numerous
times in regards to how they relate to mental health (Pargament, 1997). As the metaanalysis of Ano and Vasconcelles (2005) has evidenced, the effects of religious/spiritual
coping on mental health are consistently positive. Previous research has limited itself to
primarily studying Christians using these religious or spiritual coping strategies. Coping
strategies that double as both religious and/or spiritual have not been isolated from the
extant findings as previous studies have tended to use a combination of both the strictly
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religious coping mechanisms in conjunction with those that could be seen as
simultaneously religious and spiritual. With these limitations of previous studies in mind,
there is a need to investigate spiritual coping strategies that are not limited to religious
traditions and are not only enacted by religious adherents. Instead, investigating whether
these coping mechanisms also hold a beneficial relationship to mental health among
populations that are not religious could foster new insights about healthy living. Previous
research has shown that secular populations value spirituality (O’Connel & Skevington,
2005), thus it is plausible that secular populations might also be receiving mental health
benefits from spiritual coping mechanisms.
Findings, Interpretations, and Future Research. A second set of hypotheses
posited that religious participants who reported using religious/spiritual coping strategies
would also have better mental health (Hypothesis 2a) and that secular participants who
used religious/spiritual coping strategies would similarly experience better mental health
(Hypothesis 2b). A multiculturally considerate measure of coping that could
simultaneously be applied to both religious and secular participants was used to
investigate the relationship between religious/spiritual coping and mental health. As
expected, higher levels of religious/spiritual coping were related to greater mental health
for both groups which supported both Hypothesis 2a and 2b. The strength of this effect
was not statistically different between groups and the magnitude of this effect would be
considered between small to medium for both religious and secular participants. A
notable finding from the religious/spiritual coping analyses was the evidence that secular
participants were also using religious/spiritual coping and from a correlational standpoint
these coping behaviors appeared to associate with more favorable mental health levels.
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Horning et al. (2011) found that religious coping was used in differing amounts between
religious and secular participants and the current study confirmed those findings by also
finding that religious adherents used religious/spiritual coping more frequently. The
current study’s religious/spiritual coping scale allowed for a possible mean value between
1 and 4. Atheists’ mean value was 1.39, and agnostics’ mean value was 1.65, which were
both lower than the religious groups that ranged from values of 2.15 for the Jewish
participants and 2.67 for the Christian participants. If one were to transform Horning et
al.’s coping measure to a 1 to 4 scale like the current study’s, the mean values for
religious coping would be 1.10 for atheists, 1.21 for agnostics, 2.53 for a low
religiousness group, and 3.52 for a high religiousness group. Comparatively, the coping
trends were similar between the current study and Horning et al.’s study despite the use
of different measures and somewhat different group distinctions. Notwithstanding the
different coping frequencies between groups for the current study, the data evidenced that
religious/spiritual coping was beneficially related to mental health for both religious and
secular groups; however, religious participants evidenced more of a beneficial
relationship between religious/spiritual coping and mental health than atheists and
agnostics did specifically. Overall, the support for a positive effect between
religious/spiritual coping and mental health added to the prevailing results of numerous
previous studies that also identified the same positive relationship (e.g., Koenig et al.,
1995), but the current study’s results are unique due to the inclusion of multiple secular
groups.
As expected, the beneficial use of religious/spiritual coping strategies to counter
stressful stimuli supported an emotional regulation theoretical perspective. Based on the
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items that make up the religious/spiritual coping scale, this meant that both religious and
secular participants who more frequently prayed or meditated, purposely sought comfort
from their religious or spiritual ideals, connected spiritually with others, or focused on
their life being part of a larger spiritual force achieved more emotional regulation benefits
that presumably helped their mental health state when faced with a stressful experience.
What these activities specifically looked like for each ideological group is unclear and the
magnitude of effects of this relationship varied in strength among each ideological group
as well. For example, how a Buddhist participant found comfort in their beliefs was not
articulated and whether they experienced the same magnitude of benefits of using
religious/spiritual coping strategies with other groups was not explored in the current
study. Likewise, when an agnostic person coped by connecting spiritually with others it
may have looked different from how the Christian participant meant they spiritually
connected with others in response to stress and whether this coping method impacted
their mental health to the same extent was not investigated. Regardless of these
subjective differences, there was initial evidence in the data that spiritual coping practices
in general helped one combat stress by potentially helping them focus on each of their
spiritual proclivities that allowed for transcending beyond the difficulties that humans
face every day.
Wilkinson and Coleman (2010) felt that the crucial factor for a person to cope
effectively was having a strong ideological belief system, be it religious or secular in
nature. The current study did not test for a moderating effect between belief strength and
coping, but this study did show that religious/spiritual coping behaviors were uniquely
predictive of mental health levels even when one’s strong beliefs (i.e., theistic/atheistic
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certainty) were considered. This finding suggested that both the use of religious/spiritual
coping behaviors used in response to stressful situations and the strength of one’s belief
each played a unique, albeit small, role in affecting one’s mental health.
Limitations and Additional Implications. A limitation of only using
religious/spiritual coping items that focused on positive reactions to stress is that it
excluded the potential negative effects that sometimes occur from particular
religious/spiritual coping strategies. Pargament et al. (1998) stated that negative religious
coping strategies (e.g., being angry at God for a life stressor), despite being used less
often than positive religious coping strategies, tended to associate with poorer mental
health levels. The items on the religious/spiritual coping measure only tapped into the
relationship of positive religious/spiritual coping specifically. There is a need for
religious/spiritual coping measures that look at a broader variety of coping responses
types, be they positive or negative, while at the same time not limiting themselves to
coping that narrowly reflects only Christian, theistic, or monotheistic worldviews.
Additionally, qualitative investigations could be useful to illuminate how the different
ideological adherents used these coping strategies. The items of the current quantitative
measure were necessarily vague in order to maintain applicability to the diverse
populations being questioned, but future research that allows participants to describe their
coping experiences with greater personalized detail could shed light on how each group
specifically used their spirituality to cope with stressful contexts.
Spiritual Harmony
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Background. Koenig (2008) described that in the past social science commonly
considered that spirituality was a subcategory subsumed by religion. As theoretical
understandings evolved, Koenig detailed that more recent literature tends to consider the
relationship between these two constructs oppositely, wherein religion has become a
subcategory subsumed by spirituality. Extending from the evolution of the terms
religion and spirituality, it is presently understood that one can be spiritual without
necessarily being religious, which entails that groups such as secular people may also
endorse their own unique spiritual lifestyle.
Fisher (1998) reviewed numerous works within the psychological literature and
found that spirituality frequently possesses four component domains. The personal
domain is described as having a sense of identity, pursuing ventures that one findings
meaningful, and achieving one’s purpose in life. The communal domain consists of
experiencing rich interpersonal relationships with others. Possessing a reverence for
nature and one’s surroundings entails the third domain, the environmental domain. The
final domain, the transcendent domain, is comprised of experiencing a relationship with a
force, perhaps supernatural, such as God or a higher power. Fisher contended that a
spiritual health contributes to one’s overall health and past literature has produced
empirical evidence on numerous occasions that greater levels of spirituality in one’s life
beneficially impacts one’s mental health in particular (e.g., Mofidi et al., 2007). Fisher
would specifically define the term spiritual harmony as the extent that one fulfills their
spiritual ideals. For example, one might believe that an important component of their
personalized form of spirituality might be to worship a higher power, but if such a person
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rarely engaged in this worship then they would be experiencing little spiritual harmony in
this specific area of their spiritual life.
A major limitation of previous works was that they frequently used measures of
spirituality that suffered from construct validity issues (i.e., whether they truly separated
the measurement of spirituality and mental health from each other is debatable), and
many of these studies used spirituality measures that reflected Judeo-Christian doctrines
(e.g., Underwood & Teresi, 2002) and were thus not necessarily appropriate for use with
secular persons or adherents to religious ideologies outside of the Abrahamic religions.
The current study used a spiritual harmony measure that was applicable to a wider
diversity of ideologies with the purpose of exploring whether spiritual harmony was
related to one’s mental health for both religious and secular participants.
Findings, Interpretations, and Future Research. Perhaps the most notable
finding of the current study was the relationship between spiritual harmony and mental
health. Hypotheses 3a and 3b speculated that for religious and secular persons spiritual
harmony would be positively related to their mental health, respectively. Spiritual
harmony was measured by having participants quantify their level of beliefs across an
assortment of spiritual concepts to indicate whether they were important for their spiritual
health or not, and then quantify the extent their actual behaviors adhered to those beliefs
based on the level they endorsed them. By analyzing the discrepancy between one’s
spiritual health ideals and their actual spiritual behaviors their spiritual harmony became
apparent. Importantly, it was found that this spiritual harmony construct had the
strongest effect, a large effect, on one’s mental health. The strength of this association
was more prominent than any other variable measured in this study: income, education,
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age, religious/spiritual coping, theistic/atheistic certainty, and even social support
satisfaction. Social support satisfaction was the variable that was most predictive of
one’s mental health with a medium to large sized effect in every analysis until spiritual
harmony was included in the multivariate models, which itself then became the
frontrunner in the positive predictive relationship by a substantial margin over any other
variable because spiritual harmony remained the only large sized effect in the final
exploratory model (social support satisfaction downgraded to a medium sized effect
when spiritual harmony was introduced in the models).
What else was remarkable about this finding with spiritual harmony was that this
large effect on mental health was evident for both religious and secular participants. The
magnitude of this effect was found to be similar between both the religious and secular
participants as well, suggesting that spiritual harmony is a relevant predictor regardless of
what individual elements consist within a person’s ideology and belief tenets. Granted,
the spiritual harmony construct had differently weighted components for religious
participants versus secular participants (i.e., a different inclusion of transcendent spiritual
practices), but nonetheless this general notion of being in a state of living up to one’s
spiritual ideals came out as prominently related to one’s mental health. Based on the
factor loadings between groups, it was evident that secular participants had a noticeably
different depiction of the role that transcendent spirituality (e.g., developing a
relationship with a higher power) had in their life than the religious participants did, but
the idea of living in a consistent way with one’s spiritual health values was the crucial
factor underlying the relationship as a whole. The results of this study suggested that
people can hold a diversity of beliefs, but the content of those beliefs may be somewhat
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arbitrary as it relates to impacting one’s mental health. Perhaps what is important for
one’s health is how a person lives up to those beliefs in their day to day life. This
relationship was a substantial finding that has never been demonstrated this clearly in
previous religious and spirituality literature with diverse samples.
Given this large effect, spiritual harmony was potentially the most effective
determinant of emotional regulation compared to all the other predictor variables in this
study. Outperforming religious/spiritual coping as well as belief strength constructs,
spiritual harmony emerged as the condition that was most predictive of healthier
emotional regulation. Possible explanations for this effect were that spiritual harmony
was a more precise indicator of more adaptive responses to a person’s underlying death
anxiety, if one were to consider a terror management theoretical (TMT) perspective.
TMT describes the stimuli and reactions that surround one’s emotional conflict that one
experiences when they are aware of their inevitable demise. As Vail et al. (2010)
detailed in their discussion of TMT, engaging in spiritual or religious actions provides
one with a sense of security or psychological appeasement from the unease that
knowledge of our mortality instills within each person.
The spiritual harmony effect was not surprising when one considers the
psychological flexibility model (Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2012), which is the
basis for acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT). ACT is a form of psychotherapy
that partly focuses on committing oneself to complete value-based behaviors. Trials of
ACT therapy that specifically focused on commitment to values have evidenced
beneficial effects in reducing one’s psychological distress (Levin et al., 2012), thus
improving their mental health. With this framework in mind, future research should
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verify whether the beneficial effects of spiritual harmony are distinctly different from
completing value-based behaviors in general. Those who enact behaviors that are
consistent with their values would be expected to have more favorable mental health
levels, but clarifying that spiritual values are playing a unique role with one’s mental
health would give more credibility to the claim that diverse forms of spirituality are
strongly related to mental health, as the current findings indicated.
As noted previously, research has shown that the relationship between
religiousness and mental health was stronger and more positive when religiousness was
measured in the form of a personal/intrinsic religiousness type as opposed to an extrinsic
religiousness type (Hackney & Sanders, 2003; Ventis, 1995). It was speculated in the
current paper that perhaps there was an overlap between personal/intrinsic religiousness
and spirituality, given that spirituality’s definitions often declare it as something highly
personal (Hood et al., 2009). Support for an overlap between these two constructs
manifested in the current study, but it is also worth noting that the magnitude of the effect
of spiritual harmony on mental health exceeded even the strongest associations that
personal/intrinsic religiousness had with mental health in previous studies. The
differences in magnitude between these variables suggest that they are not complete
proxies for one another. The correlation effect sizes in the current study showed that
spiritual harmony’s relationship with each of the mental health variables exceeded the
correlation effect size found in Hackney and Sanders’ meta-analysis which was a small
sized effect, while the current study possessed mostly medium sized effects across the six
mental health variables individually (altruism being the only exception). Overall, the
data suggested that the most linear relationship found in the current study was the
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relationship between spiritual harmony and mental health. In terms of descriptiveness
and predictive usefulness, the spiritual harmony finding overshadowed the previously
described linear association between religiousness and mental health as well as the
curvilinear relationship between belief strength and mental health.
The relevance of the distinctive spiritual ideals between that of religious and
secular participants is reminiscent of the discussion of Spilka (1993) who referred to
spirituality as a “fuzzy” concept because of its obscurity and diversified usage. As the
current study showed, participants, such as atheists and theists, who obviously have
vastly differing perspectives on what spirituality means in their lives, still can relate to
their spiritual ideals in adaptive or maladaptive ways and experience the same
advantageous or disadvantageous consequences for their health regardless of the
subjective content of their spiritual ideals. The current study’s use of differing
ideological perspectives only supported the notion that creating a consistent and agreed
upon usage for the term spirituality is difficult because, as Zinnbauer et al. (1997)
explained, spirituality is idiosyncratic and highly personalized. The findings of the
current study underscored the importance of using innovative measurement methods like
the SHALOM to measure spirituality. While this measure was not perfect as to
encompass all forms of spiritual diversity, it was more fitting compared to current
measures in the field in regards to encapsulating respondent diversity and perhaps more
measures should be created in a similar fashion that include a dual response system of
comparing the endorsement of specific spiritual ideals with the extent one exhibits the
corresponding behaviors and actions. Zinnbauer, Pargament, and Scott (1999) detailed
that psychologists struggle to conduct research with an agreed upon meaning for the
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spirituality construct because they simultaneously strive to remain considerate of the
pluralism that exists regarding spirituality’s definition. The use of the discrepancy
scoring system within the SHALOM not only allowed for one to be respectful to this
pluralism, but it also created the opportunity for a research avenue that can conceivably
investigate how assorted social groups are quantitatively and conceptually defining their
idea of spirituality. As a result, measures of this type can provide an arguably acceptable
balance considerate of the tension between these pluralistic and definitional concerns.
The literature review of the current paper gave several examples of how the past
measurements of spirituality emphasized theism and/or Christianity despite the use of
these scales with diverse populations. In the future, spirituality will likely remain
considered as a personal and subjective construct as it has in recent decades, and
psychologists should consider accounting for this subjective measurement by allowing
participants to define their spiritual ideals and then indicate how well they live up to
those standards.
The current study also provided support to previous findings that secular persons
are spiritual (e.g., Chappel, 1990). Likewise, this also supported the notion that
spirituality can operate outside of the confines of religion, just as Zinnbauer et al.’s
(1997) sample demonstrated. Future research could benefit the field’s understanding and
conceptualizations by quantitatively exploring how secular spirituality and religious
spirituality overlapped and where they diverged, as Chiu (2000) suggested. Then,
parsing this out even further by examining how groups within secularity and religion
differentiate could expand the field’s understanding of spirituality even further. Fisher’s
(1998) definitional model of spiritual health was mostly supported in the current data, but
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there appeared to be an incongruence of Fisher’s model with the way secular participants
endorsed transcendent spirituality in particular. The personal, communal, and
environmental constructs coalesced strongly to form the spiritual health construct but the
transcendent subconstruct did not. Not surprisingly, this subconstruct in particular may
only be relevant for those who actively believe in God or a similar divine entity. If one
considers secular spirituality specifically, then the recommendation of Kapuscinski and
Masters (2010) may not stand, as these authors specifically recommended all spirituality
scales include a transcendence component to help differentiate spirituality from other
constructs. Although, Kapuscinski and Masters made another suggestion that does
indeed hold up when considering the results of the current study: research that uses a
spirituality measure that includes both inner experiences and overt behaviors may more
clearly capture extant relationships with other constructs. The SHALOM’s spiritual ideal
and lived experience dual response system helped capture both the internal facets and the
behavioral components of spirituality which may have helped elucidate the spiritual
construct’s relationship with other variables. Future research could verify whether
spirituality measurement that includes both internal and behavioral facets provides
incremental validity over spirituality measures that are only limited to one or the other to
test Kapuscinski and Masters’ assertion. Regardless, the current study provided evidence
that a multifaceted spirituality measure captures a range of association strengths between
variables.
Limitations. Although the measurement of spiritual harmony achieved a
respectable level of applicability to diverse social groups, its measurement could have
been heightened more if other distinct belief components were introduced and
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highlighted further. Ideally speaking, participants would have been given an option to
endorse pantheistic, polytheistic, and deistic spiritual beliefs as part of their spiritual
ideals, to name a few. Unfortunately, no spirituality measure uses a dual response system
and includes items with such content in conjunction with the traditionally used theistic
and Judeo-Christian reflective measures. The measurement of spirituality harmony could
have perhaps been more precise had participants been given the opportunity to endorse or
exclude these characteristics as part of their beliefs about spiritual health.
Similar to the limitation of the measurement of religious/spiritual coping,
understanding the facets of each person’s spiritual harmony and how they related to one’s
mental health may have been more clear if qualitative methods were also used.
Quantitative measures achieved a satisfactory level of applicability for the diverse
sample, but the items of the quantitative measures are limited in their ability to illuminate
the crucial mechanisms that link spiritual harmony with more favorable mental health.
The inclusion of more mixed methods practices may help achieve further insights in
future research.
General Strengths, Limitations, and Future Considerations
The sample of the current study was simultaneously a strength and a limitation.
The inclusion of agnostic, atheistic, Buddhist, spiritual nonreligious, and Jewish
participants was a strength because they are understudied in the psychology of religion
and spirituality field due to its Christian-centric history (Hood et al., 2009).
Unfortunately, due to Muslim, Hindu, Taoist, Pagan, and several other ideologies
completing the study in such small numbers, the current findings cannot safely be
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attributed to them. Future research would benefit from achieving even greater diversity
than the current study so that the nuanced relationships between beliefs, coping,
spirituality, and mental health are highlighted and potential differences can be learned
about further.
The data collected for this study was gathered at a single time point and was
based on self-reports. Longitudinal research designs and methodologies that go beyond
self-reports could help determine whether the relationship of these variables stays
consistent. Longitudinal methodologies in particular could allow a closer but still
imperfect approximation of causal relationships. Going beyond self-report data, such as
using other sources of data conjunctively (e.g., observer ratings of participants’ mental
health) in future studies may provide more clarity on the actual levels of mental health by
reducing the error that is sometimes associated with self-report data.
The correlational nature of the current study limited the full scientific
understanding of how each of the study’s variables truly related to each other. For
example, based on this study, it was tempting to say that living congruently with one’s
spiritual values will subsequently improve one’s health; however, it is also plausible that
the current study found that people who are initially healthy are just more likely have the
capacity to live up to their spiritual value standards. Thus, the directionality of the
effects, or whether other outside variables were pertinently involved, could not be
determined with the design of this study.
The general aim of this study was to be able to make conclusions about how
belief strength, coping, and spirituality related to a general construct of mental health.
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The inclusion of six mental health variables was enacted to be able to achieve this, but,
unfortunately, the exploratory research question and each of the hypotheses (except for
1a and 1b) used a composite latent construct of mental health that only included four of
these mental health variables (hope, positive affect, life satisfaction, and gratitude). The
exclusion of the altruism and negative affect constructs was necessary due to statistical
reasons for Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, and the exploratory research question, but ideal
conditions for interpretation would have allowed for the inclusion of all six of the
constructs. Also, in consideration that Hypothesis 1b illustrated how each of the mental
health variables shared unique relationships with the groups being compared, it would be
astute for researchers to use multiple conceptualizations of mental health and be vigilant
for differential effects between groups in future studies.
Religious and secular group comparisons, the crux of this study, could have
possibly been performed more accurately if more of the influences on the variability in
mental health could have been isolated. In particular, it may have been revelatory if the
effects of Christian privilege had been accounted for. Works such as Blumenfield (2006)
and Schlosser (2003) both outlined how Christians in the United States are at a
considerable advantage in acquiring numerous societal benefits over minority religious
groups and secular groups. This is especially pertinent because the current study was
predominantly made up of people from the United States. Access to these societal
benefits may have accounted for the variability of mental health. Societal benefits
include many facets, but a few examples relevant to the concept of privilege for the
current study include such matters as possessing a feeling of acceptance or appreciation
within society at large, regularly seeing people of one’s own ideological identity status
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depicted positively in the media, and being able to share one’s beliefs or opinions without
fear of any repercussions when around others. Recent research has highlighted how
secular people are the target of discrimination in the USA, and the perpetrators of these
acts, at least in one experimental situation, tended to be Christian (Swan & Heesacker,
2012). Only tentative conclusions should be made based off Swan and Heesacker’s study
because their sample was predominately Christian at the outset. Alternatively, Hammer,
Cragun, Hwan, and Smith (2012) conducted a correlational study that questioned atheists
about their experiences of discrimination that transpired in the last five years only.
Despite this limited time frame, 41% reported experiencing acts that included slander,
coercion, social ostracism, denial of goods and services, and hate crimes, all due to their
identification as atheist. Hammer et al. declared that experiences of discrimination
should be a considered variable whenever religion/spirituality and health association
research is being performed. Some of the subtle mental health differences between the
religious and secular participants in the current study might have lessened or even
disappeared if the impact of discrimination was controlled for. This could also be valid
for the religious participants, who, despite being the majority group in the United States,
still may experience stigmatization and discrimination themselves. The inclusion of
discrimination as a variable in future analyses is warranted especially when numerous
studies have shown that discrimination negatively impacts mental health, even when
other class distinctions are controlled for (e.g., Kessler, Mickelson, & Williams, 1999).
The inclusion of discrimination is especially pertinent when one also considers that
atheists are viewed as potentially the single most unaccepted and stigmatized group in the
United States both publicly and privately. Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann (2006) found
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that atheists were ranked number one on lists of “This group does not at all agree with my
vision of American society” and “I would disapprove if my child wanted to marry a
member of this group” while Muslims, despite also being frequent targets of
discrimination, appeared in a distant second on both lists. Notions of privilege and
discrimination as they pertain to secular groups and non-Christian religious groups
should be accounted for in future studies regarding mental health comparisons between
groups.
A Final Thought
One of the most notable implications of the current study is that the impaired
mental health stigma against secular participants (e.g., Schumaker, 1992) is at the very
least an exaggeration. Grounds for declaring that there is a substantial mental health
disparity between religious and secular groups was not supported in the current study.
An implication that can be drawn from the results of this study was that a vital
component of one’s mental health is their ability to live in accordance with their spiritual
health values, whatever those may be. General health initiatives and service providers
may want to consider encouraging spiritual living in particular. Applicable services
could include encouraging children’s healthy spiritual behaviors in schools, integrating
spiritual components into psychotherapy, increasing the well-being of patients in
hospitals, or disseminating healthy living information via various media sources to
consumers. Specifically, any of these communication or interactive avenues that aim to
positively impact the health of their respective consumers could devote time to
facilitating the reflection of one’s spiritual values. As follows, teaching and imploring
these service recipients to enact behaviors in their daily life that are congruent with their
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personally decided and reflected upon spiritual health values could be the impetus for
healthier living. Such a health service advocacy process would inherently be crossculturally considerate, because it encourages people to discover their own spiritual
values, which then adds to the widespread and personalized applicability. Numerous
societal venues, such as schools and medical centers, teach patrons how to live a
physically healthy life and a mentally healthy life. If continued research supports the
current findings, perhaps it would be time for society to begin emphatically encouraging
people to discover and pursue action that is congruent with their personalized definitions
of spiritual health.
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